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ABSTRACT 
This thesis postulates the need for the Norwegian Armed Forces to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations into the future and attempts to answer the question of how 
such operations should be conducted.   
First, the fundamental dynamics of an insurgency and a counterinsurgency are 
described using a generic model.  The following chapter then discusses the role and 
importance of information operations in such conflicts.  Next, the process of nation-
building is discussed with the aim of extracting implications for military forces.  After 
having established a theoretical foundation through discussing insurgencies, information 
operations, and nation-building, the thesis turns to a discussion of the relevant capabilities 
under the control of the Norwegian government in order to elicit important possibilities 
and limitations.  Finally, the thesis suggests both missions and important priorities for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces in a counterinsurgency operation based upon theoretical 
foundation and the means available.   The thesis concludes that while the Norwegian 
Armed Forces should be considered to be suitable for counterinsurgency operations, there 
is a significant need for education and understanding of such conflicts. 
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The progress of globalization has created a new global security environment, 
which entails that geographical distance is no longer a determining factor for potential 
threats to the security of Norwegian interests, population, and territory.1 This process, 
combined with the end of the Cold War with its predominantly bipolar global threat 
scenario, has brought along a transformation in the role and use of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces (NAF). As a result of this new role, NAF have been undergoing a considerable 
organizational and structural transformation over the last decade. This transformation has 
been aimed at changing the Norwegian defense from a threat-based organizational 
structure developed during the Cold War to a capability-based structure that can meet 
diffusible challenges in the contemporary global security environment in an efficient 
manner.2 Today, NAF are considered a vital instrument for the Norwegian authorities, 
not only in their effort to support and participate in countering threats against the security 
of the wider international community, but also to strengthen the credibility, influence, 
and political integrity of Norway as an international actor.3  This is depicted and 
formalized within the Norwegian principal national security policy objectives which state 
that within their area of responsibility and in concert with other national authorities, NAF 
must participate in “multinational peace operations and international defense cooperation 
to contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law, and respect for 
human rights.”4  
                                                 
1 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], Norwegian Defence 2008, 5–7, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf , (accessed April 25, 2009). 
2 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St. prp. Nr. 48 (2007–2008) Et forsvar til 
vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier [The Ministry of Defense: The defence, guarding 
Norwegian security, interests, and values, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007-2008)], 10–12, 
www.regjeringen.no/pages/2061722/PDFS/STP200720080048000DDDPDFS.pdf, (accessed July 25, 
2008).  
3 Ibid., 12. 
4 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], Norwegian Defence 2008, 5–7, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Fakta2008_eng.pdf , (accessed April 25, 2009). 
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Nonetheless, the use of NAF outside the borders and immediate sphere of the 
political and geographic interest of Norway is by no means a new phenomenon. Norway 
has a history of contributing to international military operations, dating back to its 
participation in the missions by the United Nations (UN) in Korea in 1952. These 
operations have taken place in environments covering the whole spectrum of threats, 
from permissive to hostile, and against both conventional and irregular opponents. All 
operations have been conducted with NAF as part of a larger coalition of international 
forces.   
Since the end of the Cold War, NAF have repeatedly faced irregular adversaries 
in insurgency conflicts, and along with the military forces of most other nations, 
experienced little success when applying the military strategies and tactics primarily 
developed to handle a conventional enemy in a Cold War setting. An important 
recognition in this context is the fact that the nature of international military interventions 
has transformed since the end of the Cold War.  This transformation is a result of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, which has enabled the international community (IC) to 
“secure international mandates, assemble broad coalitions, and employ armed force to do 
more than simply freeze conflicts and police ceasefires.”5  The broadened scope of 
international military interventions has come to include “disarming combatants; 
demobilizing armies; building new military, police and judicial establishments; holding 
elections; and helping to rebuild economies”—effectively nation-building or parts 
thereof.6  
This is currently the situation in Afghanistan, where NAF, as part of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), appear to be facing monumental 




                                                 
5 James F. Dobbins, “Nation-building and counterinsurgency after Iraq,” 4, 
www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/dobbinscopy.pdf , (accessed August 15, 2008). 
6 Ibid., 5. 
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destabilized society almost seven years after the Taliban’s ouster. The growing 
insurgency in Afghanistan obviously reflects a failure to stabilize the country and tackle 
the root causes of violence.7   
The problem of effectively re-establishing peace in a country has been extensively 
studied, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Norway has played an active role in 
addressing the problem of peace building in international forums, like the Utstein study 
of 336 peace building projects.8 The Utstein study suggested that a strategic deficit and 
lack of overall coordination between both military and civilian efforts were the key 
reasons why a majority of international peace-building projects have failed in the past.9 
Furthermore, a study conducted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI) concludes that there “is now broad consensus that today’s security challenges can 
be most effectively addressed through an integrated approach” which entails a strict 
coordination and integration of both civilian and military means.10  The Norwegian Chief 
of Defense (CHOD) recognizes this and argues that civilian and military efforts are 




                                                 
7 Crisis Group, “Security In Afghanistan,” 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3071&l=1&gclid=CKbe-4uD3JQCFSgtagod9RcTQw , 
(accessed July 25, 2008). 
8 The Utstein study was the study of the peace building experience of four countries–Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the UK–that together constitute the so-called Utstein Group, a framework for 
cooperation between the four on peace building and development issues. The aim of the study was to 
produce policy-relevant conclusions in the form of guidelines for peace building derived from the 
experiences of the four governments. 
9 Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Towards a Strategic Framework for 
Peace building: Getting their act together, 15–43, 
www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf, (accessed July 25, 
2008). 
10 Nils Nagelhus Schia and St åle Ulriksen, “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: 
Trends and Challenges,” Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt (NUPI) [The Norwegian Institute for 
International Affairs], 8, 
www.nupi.no/publikasjoner/boeker_rapporter/2007/multidimensional_and_integrated_peace_operations_tr
ends_and_challenges, (accessed May 21, 2009). 
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) is devoted to research and information on 
international relations, politics and economics, with a focus on areas of central relevance to Norwegian 
foreign policy. 
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international military interventions in general and in Afghanistan specifically. This 
suggests a new approach that entails strict coordination and the integration of both 
military and civilian means in international military interventions.11  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
“Most of the wars since 1945, indeed almost all wars, fall within the general 
category of insurgency and counter-insurgency, whether they have been dubbed small 
wars at one end of the scale or peace-keeping operations at the other,”12 and the 
Norwegian military tradition and experience gathered since 1952 form a sound basis for 
operating in these kinds of conflicts.  At the same time, there is a growing acceptance and 
understanding within the NAF for the fact that fundamental changes in both strategy and 
operations on the ground have to occur in order to be successful in cases like 
Afghanistan. This is illustrated through statements made by the Norwegian Chief of 
Defense, as well as statements from the leadership in the Norwegian Department of 
Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, comprehensive studies and 
directives directly related to the role of the NAF and an overall strategy for such conflicts 
has yet to be produced and implemented. 
Currently, NAF serve the dual purpose of defending Norwegian sovereignty as 
well as participating in international military operations when directed by the Norwegian 
government. The task of defending Norwegian sovereignty is thoroughly and 
systematically described in a vast amount of military doctrinal publications, directives, 
plans, and manuals that can be traced back to the times of the Cold War and general 
military theory of conventional warfare. Tasks related to the participation of NAF in 




                                                 
11 S. Diesen, Det vil ta tid [It will take time], (Dagbladet) 
http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2008/03/04/528785.html, (accessed July 25, 2008). General Diesen is the 
Norwegian Chief of Defense. 
12 Hew Strachan, British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq (The RUSI Journal) 152:6.  
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and within, the NAF. As of today, official military directives that address the issue have 
been limited to a rather miniscule two-page description of a general strategy for fighting 
irregular forces in the Norwegian Defense Joint Operations Doctrine.13 
As a result, the Norwegian approach to international military operations has been 
characterized by vague guidelines, limited time-horizons, and thus a very limited military 
agenda.  However, the resources spent, the duration of the contributions, and the quality 
of the forces suggest that far more could be achieved with a proper long-term and 
systematic approach to the tasks at hand. Such an approach has the definite potential of 
facilitating a more cost-effective use of the Norwegian military and civilian resources, 
and thus enhances the impression of Norway as an important international actor. As such, 
Norway can make a big sociopolitical difference, even though it is a small country on a 
global scale. Military forces have a prominent role in international peace building 
projects and this study is aimed at being a theoretically informed policy advisory for the 
NAF. Thus, the general question the authors seek to answer is: how should the 
Norwegian Armed Forces conduct counterinsurgency operations? 
 The use of NAF in international military operations entails a set of important 
ramifications for how NAF should, and can, conduct counterinsurgency operations.  In 
order to assess these ramifications, a number of important factors have to be considered. 
First, Norway will for the most part be a small actor within a larger coalition or 
alliance. Norwegian security policy emphasizes multinational approaches and 
international solidarity.14 While the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) are the cornerstones of national security policy,15 the near history shows that a 
coalition of the willing can also provide a framework for military missions outside 
Norway’s borders.  This means that for a counterinsurgency effort, the armed forces 
primarily need to be prepared to work inside coalition or alliance frameworks.   
                                                 
13 Forsvarsstaben [Norwegian Defense Staff], Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine [ Defense Joint 
Operations Doctrine] (Oslo; Forsvarsstaben, 2007), 27–29. 
14 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48,  Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007-2008), 23. 
15 Ibid. 
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Second, it seems fair to assume that in future conflicts, the theater of operations 
will require more forces than the interveners are willing to commit. Experience shows 
that a ratio of 10 to 20 military personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants can be necessary to 
stabilize a country.16  In a case like Afghanistan, this translates into as many as 640,000 
troops in order for stability operations to succeed, which is a number that is much higher 
than any member of the ISAF sees as realistic.  In other words, the number of military 
forces and other government agencies will in most cases be lower than what is needed to 
provide the security and reconstruction that is desired.  Therefore, a factor in this study is 
that operational principles need to be based on a scarcity of military forces.  
Third, Norway has held a leading role in the development of concepts for 
multidimensional and integrated peace operations within the UN.17  Currently, the UN’s 
integrated missions concept is arguably the “most advanced and best tested approach to 
the management of multidimensional and integrated peace support operations.”18  Both 
the European Union (EU) and NATO are developing similar concepts.19  Such an 
approach is also a key principle in the Norwegian foreign policy strategy for combating 
international terrorism.20  This means that NAF to a larger extent have to coordinate their 
efforts with other parts of the government.  When working in a multinational coalition, 
however, there is just as likely a need for coordinating with other governments’ efforts on 
the civilian side.  Thus, this factor necessitates a thorough understanding of 
counterinsurgency forces in general, and more specifically how NAF fit into such a 
framework of nation-building.   
                                                 
16 James T. Quinlivan, “Force requirements in stability operations,” (Parameters) 25:4, 63. 
17 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007-2008), 36. 
18 Nils Nagelhus Shia and Ståle Ulrichsen, “Multidimensional and integrated peace operations,” 
Norsk Utenriks Politisk Institutt [The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs], Security in Practice 6 
(2007): 9. 
19 Ibid., 11–12. 
20 Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Foreign policy strategy for combating 
international terrorism (Ministry of Foreign affairs), 18, 
www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0124/ddd/pdfv/291587-terrorstrategi_eng.pdf, (accessed 
August 21, 2008). 
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Fourth, the presence and utility of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in 
almost all armed conflicts present armed forces with both leverage and challenges; 
leverage in the respect that NGOs support the local population and the process of nation-
building, and challenge in the respect that they by their nature need to distinguish and 
separate themselves from the armed forces.  In the case of Norway, the government funds 
a large number of NGO projects.  The Norwegian NGOs “maintain that there is little 
pressure [from the government] to pursue goals other than their own” – and that the 
government influence is achieved through “mutual influence and adaption.”21  In an 
integrated approach, however, the potential for achieving coordination with NGOs should 
be thought through.  This requires the governmental actors to approach the NGOs in a 
way that does not threaten their integrity and thereby safety. 
To effectively encompass these factors, and also answer the overall topic of how 
the NAF should conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the authors have derived 
a set of questions that will be addressed in this study.   
1. What is an insurgency and what are the principles for counterinsurgency?  
2. How does the psychological domain influence the outcome of insurgency 
conflicts, and what are the implications for counterinsurgents with regards 
to the use of information operations? 
3. What is the process of nation-building, and what are the roles of the 
different actors in such an effort in general, and the roles of the military 
actor specifically? 
4. What are the capabilities and limitations of the NAF with regards to COIN 
operations, and how will Norwegian non-military means influence the way 




                                                 
21 Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. New roles for non-governmental 
organisations in development cooperation, 25, 
www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2006/New-roles-for-non-governmental-
organisations-in-development-cooperation/4.html?id=420467, (accessed April 14, 2009). 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The study is based on qualitative research of both empirical and conceptual 
literature on COIN and interrelated topics.  In Chapter II the authors seek to describe 
what an insurgency is and what the principles for counterinsurgency are. This is done by 
illustrating the socio-political mechanisms and dynamics of an insurgency and how to 
efficiently counter an insurgency, thus establishing a generic framework of understanding 
for COIN. The framework will be based on Professor Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond 
Model,” which is a powerful heuristic tool to understand the characteristics of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency.22 To reveal the implications and practical ramifications of this 
model, the authors will utilize conceptual literature on COIN to add details and form the 
basis for understanding the tasks at hand.  This will provide the reader with generic 
concepts of how to efficiently counter and limit the growth and effect of an insurgency in 
a short-term view. 
Insurgency conflicts “are fought politically and psychologically, with the 
assistance of military capabilities.”23 Chapter III outlines how a counterinsurgent force 
should address the psychological aspects of insurgency conflicts by systematically 
influencing the perceptions and preferences of the actors of the conflict that were outlined 
in Chapter II. The ability to influence both adversarial and non-adversarial actors in a 
systematic and planned manner, or what is termed information operations (IO), is 
imperative to the success of a counterinsurgent.24  It follows that the purpose of this 
chapter is to provide general guidelines for how COIN forces should implement  
 
 
                                                 
22 Professor Gordon McCormick is the Chairman of the Department of Defense Analysis at the U.S. 
Navy Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His model, “The Diamond,” is a powerful heuristic tool 
which explains the socio-political mechanisms and principles of an insurgency and how to counter an 
insurgency. His model has yet to be published, but has provided the foundation for several articles and 
numerous student theses.   
23 Gen Richard G. Stillwell, “political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency”, 
Psychological Operations – Principles and Case Studies, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley 
Jr., (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Al, 1996), 319. 
24 Lt Col Norman E. Emery, Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of 
People, Capabilities, and Effects, Military Review, November-December 2008, 27. 
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information operations (IO) in their overall efforts, and this will be done by discussing 
the crucial role IO plays in insurgency conflicts as well as the components and challenges 
of IO in COIN. 
Chapter IV addresses the process of nation-building and the general roles of the 
different actors in establishing a legitimate government and thus effectively ensuring the 
long-term consensus of the population. To achieve success in this endeavor, a long-term 
overall strategy, encompassing kinetic and non-kinetic, military and civilian means, is of 
paramount importance. The authors will address challenges with regards to nation-
building that NAF units are likely to face in a counterinsurgency environment. 
Chapter V reviews the contemporary military and political limitations and 
possibilities of NAF in light of the counterinsurgency framework and theory described in 
Chapters II, III, and IV.  The chapter will discuss the possibilities and limitations of 
Norwegian resources that can be utilized for counterinsurgency efforts based on 
empirical and conceptual literature related to the topic of the authors’ discussion.  Besides 
the capacity and capability of the armed forces, some important restrictions and 
possibilities in government procedures will be taken into account.   
In Chapter VI, official goals for the use of NAF in counterinsurgency missions 
will be addressed. These goals will form an anchor point, together with the capabilities 
and limitations of NAF discussed in Chapter V, for the discussion of how NAF should 
conduct COIN. In addition, a generic Norwegian COIN model will be presented. This 
model is based on the framework and principles for COIN as described in Chapters II, III, 
and IV, as well as the contemporary military and political limitations and possibilities of 
Norwegian resources described in Chapter V. This model is then used to frame the 
discussion for how NAF should conduct COIN. Chapter VI is concluded with a set of 





John Mackinlay argues that previous insurgencies were primarily monolithic or 
national in form and thus can be perceived as far less complex and sophisticated than the 
transnational jihadist insurgency of today.25 Furthermore, almost all contemporary 
academic literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies advocates a transnational 
approach to what is in fact a transnational security problem. However, since the scope of 
this study is limited to how NAF should conduct counterinsurgency operations, the 
authors’ discussion and recommendations are thus limited to generic monolithic 
insurgencies which have very specific local goals (like overthrowing a local government) 
and who derive most of their power from the local population.26  
Furthermore, this study is focused on how NAF should conduct COIN as part of a 
multinational coalition in a foreign country.  It follows that the detailed structure and 
organization of NAF, as well as official Norwegian goals with regards to the use of NAF 
abroad, will not be the subject of any discussion in this study. These factors will be 
addressed with the sole purpose of framing the discussion of how NAF should conduct 
COIN based on general principles, and thus underpin the practicality and feasibility of the 
policy recommendations of this study.  
Whereas the primary goal of the study is to arrive at a theoretically informed 
policy recommendation, there is a secondary aim to provide a comprehensive overview 
of COIN theory.  This means that Chapters II through IV will cover the theory in greater 
detail than what is required for the conclusion itself.  It is the authors’ hope that this study 
can act as a stepping-stone towards a new Norwegian doctrine for low intensity conflicts 
and counterinsurgency operations or, at least, a more systematic approach to COIN.  
Lastly, conclusions and recommendations in this study are based on the personal 
perceptions, views, and analyses of the authors and do not represent any official policy or 
doctrine.    
                                                 
25 John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking COIN, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 




On February 6, 1981, Yoweri Museveni led his Popular Resistance Army (PRA) 
of 35 men with 27 guns in an attack against the barracks of the Ugandan Army in 
Kabamba.27 This attack was the first of many in the “people’s war” that Museveni and 
his friends decided to take on to overthrow the regime of Milton Obote. The PRA 
evolved into the National Resistance Army of Uganda (NRA) and this insurgency 
movement toppled the regime of President Obote and captured Kampala, the capital of 
Uganda, in January 1986.28 Museveni was sworn in as the new president of Uganda on 
the January 29, 1986, barely five years after the initial and futile attacks of his minuscule 
PRA.  In a more well-known case, Mao Tse-tung was one of 13 men who founded the 
Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.  This marked the start of 28 years of struggle, 
which succeeded when Mao took power over China in 1949. 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical understanding of insurgencies.  First, it 
provides an oversight of the causes and typology of insurgencies.  Second, a model is 
introduced to explain the strategies of the struggle between insurgents and 
counterinsurgents.  Third, as this model is based on classical COIN theory, characteristics 
of contemporary insurgencies are discussed and then related to the model. 
A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY? 
The cases mentioned above are typical of successful insurgencies in several ways. 
First, all insurgencies “start from nothing and grow”29 and second, insurgencies are not 
conventional conflicts between state actors but rather between a state actor and a 
resistance movement primarily originating from within the population basis of the state 
actor.   
                                                 
27 Pascal Ngoga, African Guerillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1998), 95. 
28 Ibid., 91. 
29 Mao Tse-tung, On guerrilla warfare, 96, 
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Pages/Publications71.aspx, (accessed September 14, 2007).  
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“Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself”30 and only between 12 and 
18 percent of all wars since 1945 have been conventional wars. In other words, most wars 
have thus been something else.31 Figure 1 shows the frequency and spread of such wars 
over the period 1956-2006. 
 
Figure 1.   Insurgencies in the Period 1956–2006 (After: Gompert et al.32) 
Professor Hew Strachan argues that of the wars in this period of time, “indeed 
almost all wars, fall within the general category of insurgency and counter-insurgency, 
whether they have been dubbed small wars at one end of the scale or peace-keeping 
                                                 
30 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), I–2. 
31 Hew Strachan, “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq”, The RUSI Journal 152 (2007): 
11 Professor Hew Strachan is Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford, and Director 
of the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. He has previous experience as a 
professor at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. 
32 David C. Gompert et al., War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency, (Santa Monica, the RAND Corporation, 2008), 373–377, 
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.2.pdf, (accessed February 11, 2008. 
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operations at the other.”33 The British Army defines insurgency as “actions of a minority 
group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of 
subversion, propaganda, and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad 
mass of people to accept such a change.”34 The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual on 
the other hand defines an insurgency as an “organized, protracted politico-military 
struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, 
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” over the 
population.35 Thus, the American definition of insurgencies not only identifies the 
politico-military aspect in insurgency conflicts, but also emphasizes the vital aspect of 
protraction.  The political aspect and the likelihood of a protracted conflict accentuate 
that in addition to being a conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor, 
insurgencies cannot be won in swift and decisive campaigns by military means alone. 
General Sir Frank Kitson, one of the most influential British counterinsurgency theorists 
and practitioners, argues that there “can be no such thing as a purely military solution 
because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”36 As a result, today’s 
conventional military organizations, focused solely on military affairs, face great 
challenges in the predominant form of contemporary war, namely insurgencies.37 
1. Causes of Insurgencies 
So why do insurgencies occur? As stated, insurgencies are as old as warfare 
itself38 and Aristotle argued that  
The universal and chief cause of … revolutionary feeling [is] … the desire 




                                                 
33 Strachan, “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 11. 
34 Cited in “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 10. 
35 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, I-2. 
36 Cited in “British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” 11. 
37 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation Of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 20. 
38 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, I–2. 
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than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when 
conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more 
but the same or less than their inferiors.39 
This implies that if a segment of a population feels that the rest of the population, 
and frequently the ruling elite, are not granting them the same fair treatment and 
opportunities as their perceived peers, there is likely to be a desire for societal change or 
what Aristotle refers to as “revolutionary feelings.” More importantly, when a segment of 
a population perceives themselves to be superior, while at the same time being treated as 
equals to the rest of the population, there is also, according to Aristotle, fertile ground for 
“revolutionary feelings.” Thus, revolutionary feelings occur when there is a disparity 
between how elements of a population perceive themselves and expect to be treated and 
how they in fact are perceived and treated by the rest of the population and most often 
ruling elites. This disparity is the “sine qua non” for insurgency movements, which is 
dependent on magnifying and capitalizing on social friction and discontent within a 
population to gain support for their cause.40 Chalmers Johnson describes this disparity as 
a “social disequilibrium” and argues that this disequilibrium can, but not necessarily will, 
trigger a violent change of society in the form of an insurgency.41 Thus, the use of violent 
means and insurgencies to achieve societal change is only likely to be employed when 
nonviolent means and attempts have failed.42  
2. Types and Characteristics of Insurgencies 
Bard O’Neill distinguishes between the following six different types of 
insurgency movements: “secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, 
conservative and reformist.”43  
                                                 
39 Cited in “Revolutionary Change” by Chalmers Johnson, 2 ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 4. 
40 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970), 152. 
41 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 61–82. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 Donald J. Alberts et al., Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. Bard E. O’Neill (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980), 2. 
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Secessionist insurgents “reject the existing political community of which they are 
formally a part” and seek to disengage from this community and establish a new 
autonomous political community based on political or religious belief or ethnical 
origin.44  A historical example is the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), or the Kurdish 
Workers Party, which has been fighting both the Turkish government and the previous 
regime in Iraq with the aim of establishing a sovereign Kurdish state.  
Revolutionary insurgents “seek to impose a new regime based on egalitarian 
values and centrally controlled structures” by mobilizing the masses within a population 
to “radically transform the social structure within an existing political community.”45 
Maoist insurgencies are prime examples of revolutionary insurgency movements and 
recent examples of such movements are the Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path) 
movement in Peru and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN).  
Restorational insurgents, like revolutionary insurgents, also seek to displace an 
existing regime, but the values and societal structures they champion are primarily 
identified with a recent political order.46 Resistance movements in Europe during World 
War II are historical examples of restorational insurgencies.  To some degree, the Taliban 
movement in Afghanistan is a contemporary example of a restorational insurgency 
movement.  
However, the Taliban movement, along with their Al Qaeda counterparts, is also 
an example of reactionary insurgency movements, which seek to reconstitute a past 
political and societal order based on perceptions of an “idealized, golden age of the 
distant past in which religious values and authoritarian structures were predominant.”47  
Conservative insurgency movements are odd phenomena.  They “seek to maintain 
the existing regime in the face of pressures on the authorities to change it.”48 One rare 
                                                 
44 Donald J. Alberts et al., Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. Bard E. O’Neill (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980), 2. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Alberts et al., Insurgency in the Modern World, 3. 
48 Ibid. 
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example of a conservative insurgency movement was the unionist or loyalist movement 
in Northern Ireland and their violent offshoot, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).  
Finally, reformist insurgents seek “to obtain more political, social, and economic 
benefits without necessarily [totally] rejecting the political community, regime, or 
authorities” and their primary concern is politics that are perceived to be 
discriminatory.49 Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare (UCK), or the Albanian National 
Liberation Army in Macedonia, was able to enforce political changes in the Republic of 
Macedonia within a few months in 2001, and is thus a recent example of a reformist 
insurgency movement. 
Hence, different goals anchored in different types of perceived social 
disequilibrium provide the grounds for different types of insurgency movements. In 
addition, insurgency movements are also likely to employ different means to achieve 
their goals, depending on the following: the degree of initial popular support for their 
cause, the environment the insurgency takes place in, the level of external support for the 
insurgency, and the efficiency of the counterinsurgent.50 However, a common 
denominator for all insurgency movements is that they are inferior, at least initially, in 
manpower and firepower to the counterinsurgent. Not only is a starting insurgency at a 
severe force disadvantage, it is also illegal, almost by definition.   
Bowyer Bell suggests that the illegal nature of an insurgency movement forces its 
members to work within what he describes in somewhat fanciful terms as a 
“Dragonworld.”51 Due to governmental countermeasures, and the ensuing need for 
secrecy, potential insurgents must abandon a normal lifestyle and voluntarily withdraw 
from overt social networks and enter this Dragonworld, which is an illicit, covert, and 
dangerous environment.52 The need for secrecy also restrains insurgency movements 
from establishing robust and flexible organizational infrastructures.  Combined with their 
                                                 
49 Alberts et al., Insurgency in the Modern World, 3. 
50 Ibid, 5. 
51 John Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld: Covert Communication and the Rebel 
Ecosystem,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 3, no 1 (Spring 1989), 17. 
52 Ibid. 
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inherent force disadvantage, such movements are thus likely to “emphasize staying power 
rather than firepower,” and “endurance and attrition rather than traditional victory.”53 The 
so-called Dragonworld environment is “the badlands of revolution” and, because of its 
unfriendly characteristics, it is perceived as a temporary necessity in the insurgents’ quest 
to topple the government or state actor.54  
The obvious advantage of operating covertly is that it provides the insurgents with 
an information advantage; an insurgent can easily identify and observe government 
forces while not identifying himself as an insurgent.  The counterinsurgent or state actor, 
on the other hand, is by definition forced to operate overtly to fulfill the expectations and 
demands for governmental structure and order within society. Thus, the insurgents have 
the advantage of easily identifying prime targets for their activities, and at the same time 
waiting safely for a favorable situation and then choosing their hour in a way that 
neutralizes inferiority in manpower and firepower.55  However, in order to be successful 
the insurgency movement must also “grow from small to large; from weakness to 
strength, or else it will fail.”56 This requires extraction of the necessary resources from 
the population.  
3. An Insurgency is not a Low-Intensity Variant of a Conventional High-
Intensity Conflict 
Conventional military doctrine normally emphasizes the need to strike the 
opponent’s military capacities.  Such doctrine assumes that the destruction of these 
capacities will ensure the downfall of the opponent and, ultimately, that this downfall will 
allow the attacker to take control over the opposing population and its resources.  This 
paradigm creates serious problems when transferred to a counterinsurgency campaign. 
The idea of going directly after the insurgency’s organization, weapons, and 
personnel fits with a conventional military paradigm and seems to offer a reasonable 
                                                 
53 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 152. 
54 Bowyer Bell, “Aspects of the Dragonworld,” 17. 
55 David Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice, (New York: Fredrick A Praeger, 
1968), 6.  
56 Ibid., 7. 
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chance of success.  However, experience indicates otherwise, as a study of 
counterinsurgency best practices concluded that this approach has historically led to 
failure.57 
First, such an approach does not deal with the insurgency’s information 
advantage.  In other words, what is visible of the insurgency is likely to be only the tip of 
an iceberg, and the state risks expending all its resources in destroying this tip.  Second, 
proficient insurgents will make sure that the population suffers from the state’s attempt to 
root out the insurgents, thus creating favorable conditions for the insurgency to grow. 
The insurgency, on the other hand, is unlikely to make the mistake of choosing a 
strategy of attacking the state directly; it is self-evident that it is necessary to grow before 
an attempt to overthrow the state can be successful.  It follows, therefore, that control 
over the population is the key to overcoming the opening disadvantages for both 
contestants. The insurgency needs the population to grow and the state needs the 
population to expose the insurgency.   
The interaction between the insurgents and the population is not only related to 
the supplies they extract and the manpower they recruit, but also to the fact that the 
insurgents in the end are dependent upon support from the population to be victorious in 
the conflict with the counterinsurgent. The rationale is that if the insurgents “manage to 
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its 
active support… [they]… will win the…[conflict]… because, in the final analysis, the 
exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population 
or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”58   
The population consequently becomes a center of gravity for both actors.  The net 
result is that the population becomes the battleground in insurgency conflicts as they 
provide the belligerents the only way to overcome their opening disadvantages—namely 
manpower and firepower in the case of the insurgents, and information in the case of the 
counterinsurgents. 
                                                 
57 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best practices in counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May/June 2005, 10. 
58 Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare, (2006), 8. 
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This basic insight is also the basis for the following classical definition of an 
insurgency: “an insurgency/counterinsurgency is a two-dimensional zero-sum game for 
control over the population.”59  The first dimension is the distribution of control.  A 
higher degree of control in this dimension means that more people are under the influence 
of the insurgents/counterinsurgents.  The second dimension is the degree of control of 
each individual.  A higher degree of control in this dimension implies more and stronger 
means to influence the ones within reach.60   
B. THE DIAMOND MODEL 
The Diamond Model was developed by Professor Gordon McCormick at the 
Naval Postgraduate School and is depicted in Figure 2.  Since its inception in 1995, the 
Diamond Model has been refined and used as a conceptual framework for successful 
counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines.  The model, as presented here, is based 
on Professor McCormick’s seminar in guerrilla warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School 
during the fall of 2007. 
1. Underlying Principles 
The model rests on a few underlying principles from classical counterinsurgency 
theory.  In essence, and based on the assumption that the counterinsurgent opens with a 
force advantage, the model assumes that an insurgency cannot overthrow the state until it 
has grown to a capacity to do so through the use of power. In order to reach this critical 
capacity, an insurgency has to obtain the following three basic resources: people, guns, 
and money. 
In guerrilla warfare, the primary source for these resources is the population.  The 
insurgency needs to manage the insurgent system,61 and thereby over time grow to the  
 
 
                                                 
59 Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare, (2006), 8 
60 Ibid. 
61 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 32. 
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point where it can take power.  It follows that the insurgency needs to control an 
increasing part of the population—both for obtaining resources, and in order to maintain 
its information advantage—until it is ready to take on the state directly. 
2. The Actors in the Diamond Model 
From the description above, it is clear that the basic struggle takes place between 
the following three principal actors: the state, the insurgents (also known as the counter-
state) and the population.  These actors are treated as “black boxes” in the model, 
meaning that they are represented as single entities without looking into the internal 
dynamics of each entity.   
The state actor encompasses entities that seek to uphold the government or state 
apparatus.  That includes civil administration, law enforcement organizations, and 
military forces, as well as support from international actors that are actively participating 
in the struggle.  Examples could be an international police mission or military forces 
from the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Conversely, the counter-state actor encompasses entities that seek to overthrow 
the government, or replace or take over the state apparatus.  The counter-state may be 
composed of several insurgent organizations, and they may not necessarily be working in 
concert with each other. 
In addition to the fundamental triangle between state, counter-state, and the 
population, international actors may play a prominent role.  Insurgents can receive 
support in the form of people, guns, and money from abroad and, perhaps more 
important, sanctuary or safe havens outside the boundaries of the state’s territory.  
Similarly, the state can enlist international support beyond direct involvement.  Examples 
of this can be exchange of intelligence, border control, interdiction of resources flowing 
to the counter-state, etc.  For these reasons, the model is not complete without 
representing these international actors.  It is important to recognize, however, that the 
international actors can only reinforce what is going on among the other three actors, as 
an international actor does not substitute any of the other three. 
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Figure 2.   The Diamond Model (From: Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in guerrilla 
warfare,” lectures at the Naval Postgraduate School 2007) 
3. Strategies and Options 
The Diamond Model outlines a number of principal strategies for the state and the 
counter-state.  In addition to this set of strategies, the population also has important 
choices to make.   
a. The Population’s Choices 
The population’s choices are: 
 Support the insurgency 
 Support neither the counter-state nor the state 
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 Support the state 
 Support both the state and the counter-state 
It is worth noting that of the options above, the first two will serve the 
counter-state’s cause, while the last two will benefit the state the most.  The logic behind 
this is that the counter-state can enlist active support from a few key supporters while 
maintaining its information advantage, as long as the population is not supporting the 
state.  T.E. Lawrence put this succinctly in 1920, when he wrote 
It [a rebellion] must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but 
sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. 
Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per 
cent passively sympathetic.62  
In other words, not supporting the state equals passive support to the 
counter-state.  Similarly, the state is not competing with the counter-state to grow and 
obtain resources.  If the population chooses to give the state information about the 
counter-state, and at the same time provides people, guns, and money to the counter-state, 
this will take away the counter-state’s information advantage and thus give the state the 
upper hand. 
As an insurgency/counterinsurgency is a two-dimensional struggle, it is 
worth noting that while the state might have the broadest distribution in geographic 
terms, the counter-state is likely to be better represented in depth wherever it chooses  
to be.  This representation is critical in influencing the population in their choices among 
the options above.  Leites and Wolf argue that “attitudes, in the sense of preferences, 
affect behavior but are not identical with it; nor in most cases are they the primary 
influence on it.”63  
Rather, they suggest it is the assisted preference that determines the 
population’s behavior.  Backing the insurgency can result in going to prison or being 
branded as a traitor if the state wins.  Backing the state might induce violence or even 
death if the counter-state is successful.  “In the population’s calculations of the options 
                                                 
62 Thomas Edward Lawrence, “The evolution of a revolt,” Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 
Institute, 1990, 22.  
63 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 45. 
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available, predictions of the consequences of alternative actions may be crucial.”64 A key 
point here is that a population is likely to choose “today’s safety at the cost of tomorrow’s 
welfare.”65   
The implications for counterinsurgency are profound.  First of all, it is a 
question of credibility.  An effective guerilla organization will follow up on its threats.  
Conversely, the state has to promise the population protection from the insurgency, while 
a growing insurgency is a sure sign of the state’s inability to do so in the first place.  The 
competition for credibility, therefore, is tilted in favor of the counter-state.  Second, it is a 
question of time.  Even though a state may promise a better situation in the long-term, the 
short-term need to survive is likely to outweigh the value of long-term improvements.  
Again, this can be exploited by a counter-state that is willing to use violence and threats. 
As a side note, it is worth mentioning that “hearts and minds” campaigns 
are directed towards the true preference, or what Leites and Wolf term attitudes.  From 
the discussion above, it is clear that an effort to influence the true preference of the 
population is likely to have little impact as long as the counter-state is able to effectively 
threaten the population.  As Galula puts it: “When a man’s life is at stake, it takes more 
than propaganda to budge him.”66 
b. State Strategies 
 Strategy 1: Control the population; this normally means to 
establish the state’s presence to the degree that law and order can 
be enforced.  A crucial aim for this strategy is to remove the 
counter-state’s ability to influence the population’s behavior 
through intimidation. 
 Strategy 2: Degrade the counter-state’s interaction with the 
population and thereby deny the counter-state the resources it 
needs.  The counter-state needs to have a distributed control-
mechanism to enlist popular support, and it is this mechanism that 
is the target of this strategy. 
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65 Ibid., 44. 
66 Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare, (2006), 55. 
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 Strategy 3: Target the core of the counter-state organization; take 
away its resources and core personnel. 
 Strategy 4: Interdict the counter-state’s flow of resources from 
international actors.   
 Strategy 5: Dissuade international actors from supporting the 
counter-state. 
c. Counter-state Strategies 
 Strategy 1: Control the population.  The aim of this strategy is to 
ensure that the insurgency can grow through active support, while 
at the same time ensuring the passive support of the population and 
thereby maintaining the information advantage.   
 Strategy 2: Sever the links between the government and the 
population.  By displacing the government and reducing its 
relevance for the population, the population is less likely to see the 
state as the winner of the conflict and a guarantor of its promises. 
 Strategy 3: Attack the state directly.  To be successful, this strategy 
requires that the counter-state has grown to a point where the state 
no longer has a force advantage.  By destroying the state, the 
counter-state can take power and implement its policies.   
 Strategy 4: Just as the state can interdict international support to 
the counter-state, the counter-state can disrupt international support 
to the state. 
 Strategy 5: The counter-state can also dissuade international actors 
from supporting the state actor.  This can be done through making 
it more costly to support the state actor; either directly through 
attacking personnel and material, or indirectly by influencing 
popular opinion in the international actor’s domestic audiences. 
d. The Importance of International Actors 
First, it seems clear that a counter-state supported by an international actor 
does not have to rely on active support by the population to the same degree that it would 
without that international support.  Second, a sanctuary across an international border can 
be a very valuable asset for an insurgency.  In such a safe haven, the limitations of the 
Dragonworld do not apply to the same degree, thereby enabling the counter-state to 
communicate, coordinate, and prepare for future operations with greater ease.   
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Arguably, such cross-border sanctuaries had great importance in the 
Vietnam War, in the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s, and even  
in today’s conflict in Afghanistan.  Similarly, the much-referred-to successful 
counterinsurgency in Malaya was characterized by a lack of such cross-border 
sanctuaries.  The French were able to deny the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) such 
a sanctuary by establishing a fence along the Algeria/Tunisia border.67 
Nevertheless, the counter-state will still need to operate hidden from the 
state, which requires some degree of passive support from the population.  Moreover, it is 
the basic relationship between the state, the population, and the counter-state that defines 
the problem; the international actors will not represent a problem unless there is a 
problem internally.   
e. Sequence of Strategies 
For these reasons, it seems clear that the state needs to start with strategy 1 
in order to gain information about the counter-state’s distributed control mechanism.  By 
denying the counter-state’s ability to threaten the population, such information is likely to 
be forthcoming.  This information, of course, will expose the infrastructure of the 
counter-state, which can then be targeted effectively as part of strategy 2. 
As strategy 2 is carried out and personnel from the counter-state’s 
organization are either arrested or killed, this leads to exposure of the core of the counter-
state organization. This core is then the focus of strategy 3.   
At this time, it is worth noting that the state at any time can receive 
information that enables action against the counter-state core.  Such information should, 
of course, be acted upon in order to degrade the efficiency of the counter-state.  It is 
nevertheless important to recognize that this does not justify abandoning strategy 1, as 
strategy 1 will enable the state to conduct strategy 2, which in turn will enable strategy 3. 
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As far as strategies 4 and 5 go, a similar logic applies.  By interdicting 
support that flows across an international border, one can identify who the international 
supporters are, and thereby devise ways and means to influence them to stop providing 
support.  Strategies 4 and 5 are not tied to the strategy sequence 1–2–3.  In other words, 
strategy 4 can be initiated concurrently with strategies 1, 2, or 3. 
C. CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES 
1. Characteristics of Contemporary Insurgencies 
Kilcullen sees the theory based on the “wars of liberation from 1944 to about 
1982” as classical counterinsurgency theory.68  The underpinnings of the Diamond 
Model are very much consistent with this set of theories.   
Kilcullen argues that the insurgencies observed since 9/11 are different from the 
wars of liberation, and that these differences have an important impact on 
counterinsurgency theory as well.  His argument is based on observations of the 
insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Thailand, and the Northwest 
Frontier Province of Pakistan. 
The first set of observations is tied to the relationship between the state and the 
counter-state.  A key tenet of classical counterinsurgency theory is that the counter-state 
initiates a conflict against a sitting regime.  In several of the contemporary insurgencies, 
however, this has not been the case.  In Chechnya, Somalia, and East Timor, insurgencies 
have followed state failure.69  As such, they are not as much overthrowing the state as 
they are dismembering the state’s remnants.  In other cases, like in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Chechnya, it is the state actor that has initiated a military campaign and 
insurgencies have emerged as a strategic reaction.70  In the former cases, a 
counterinsurgency needed to include a heavy emphasis on nation-building in addition to  
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fighting insurgents.  In the latter cases, it is more difficult to generalize.  Nevertheless, it 
is perhaps worth noting that an insurgency that is reactionary may start with a greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and thereby grow faster.    
It is perhaps in the view on ends that contemporary insurgencies differ the most 
from the classical insurgencies.  The classical definition of insurgencies implies a 
struggle for power, but several of the contemporary insurgencies seem to be focused on 
undermining or destroying the state, rather than taking its place.71  Such groups can be 
seen as what O’Neill terms restorational or reactive insurgencies, rather than 
revolutionary insurgencies.  This, in turn, does not require a united front or a central 
leadership, thus paving the way for a multitude of various, and often conflicting, agendas 
and organizations.   
Such an orientation is also made possible and strengthened through religious 
motivation.  In Kilcullen’s words, an insurgent motivated by religion might not seek to 
achieve anything in particular, but “rather to be a mujahid, earning God’s favor (and hope 
of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.”72 
The role as a resistance group or a strategic spoiler also negates the need for 
carefully building a rural power base.  Through the use of urban operations, 
contemporary insurgencies have succeeded in imposing significant limitations on the 
counterinsurgent’s behavior.  Urban terrain places one such limitation on the use of force 
and choice of weapons; conversely, it contains a risk of alienating larger portions of the 
population.  Through the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), insurgents have not 
only been able to kill counterinsurgents more effectively (i.e., with less use of 
manpower), but the weapons also make the population afraid of being near 
counterinsurgent forces, effectively limiting the counterinsurgent intelligence as well as 
the ability to protect and reassure the population.73   
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The second set of differences concerns the impact of globalization.  
Contemporary insurgents have access to a global audience and can use the Internet as a 
virtual sanctuary.74  This virtual sanctuary can be used to raise funds, recruit, train, 
communicate, plan, and collect intelligence, and it is mostly beyond control of the 
counterinsurgent.75  While this may be seen just as a modern version of international 
support to the counter-state, its true importance lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult 
to control.76  The significance of this virtual sanctuary has become evident, as insurgents 
in Iraq are so well-funded that they do not depend on financial support from the Iraqi 
population.  On the contrary, they can pay local citizens to carry out tasks.  Hence, the 
classical approach of separating the insurgents from the population in order to deprive 
insurgents of resources is not necessarily effective where a virtual sanctuary is 
available.77   
Further, the high penetration of mass media ensures that activity at the lowest 
level might have a strategic impact, with the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal being a 
prime example.78  Similarly, the insurgents exploit this media coverage to spread the 
impact of their actions far beyond the area of operations, with the objective being to 
erode the political will to continue the counterinsurgency struggle. 
2. Implications for Contemporary Counterinsurgency 
Kilcullen suggests seven characteristics for a new counterinsurgency paradigm.  
His first is to substitute the classical competition for legitimacy and control with a 
competition to mobilize.  According to Kilcullen, the difference is that the counter-state’s 
aim of establishing a government is relegated to a second priority, if existent at all.  
Instead, the counter-state can win if it succeeds in mobilizing local support as well as a 
global audience in order to create such big problems for the counterinsurgent that he has 
to give up.  Similarly, the state actor needs to mobilize “home population, the host  
                                                 
74 Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 4. 
75 Ibid., 3. 
76 Ibid., 3. 
77 Ibid., 7. 
78 Ibid., 6. 
 29
country, the global audience, the populations of allied and neutral countries, and the 
military and government agencies involved,” thereby preventing the adversary from 
mobilizing. 79  
Second, the counterinsurgent needs to broaden the geographic scope; the area of 
interest may need to “include all neighboring countries, and its area of interest may need 
to be global.”80  The purpose of this is to counter the support that the counter-state is able 
to draw from around the world.  Kilcullen suggests that this implies a “vastly increased 
role for diplomacy, global intelligence liaison and information operations.”81 
Third, due to the increasing complexity of organizations and objectives, the role 
of the counterinsurgent is to “control a complex ecosystem” in order to impose order on 
an “unstable and chaotic environment.”82  The classical theory emphasizes the defeat of a 
single opponent, or at least a united front of opponents.  Kilcullen suggests that 
contemporary insurgencies are characterized by fighting a multitude of conflicting 
entities as well as handling possible differing interests between various actors on the 
state’s side.   
Fourth, the strong emphasis on unity of effort or unity of command in classical 
COIN theory is more incompatible with reality than ever.  The media, religious leaders, 
non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations are all critical 
components in the conflict, but cannot be controlled as part of the COIN organization.  
Kilcullen suggests that the counterinsurgent needs to secure critical support from such 
entities through facilitating a common understanding of the problem and providing 
enablers for collaboration.83 
Fifth, Kilcullen believes that all commanders—down to the lowest level—might 
need to “conceive of their task as a form of political warfare in which perception and 
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political outcomes matter more than battlefield success.”84  This is also true in classical 
COIN theory, but Kilcullen suggests that it has become even more important than 
previously. 
Sixth, the criteria for victory may need to be redefined to include permanent 
containment, as opposed to a total or near total defeat, of the terrorist risk.85 This is a 
result of the fact that contemporary insurgency movements are capable of posing as a risk 
even without leadership or large membership numbers.  Therefore, the counterinsurgent 
may have to live with remnants of a multitude of insurgent entities and instead aim to 
suppress their impact rather than defeating the opponent fully. 
Finally, “secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness based on 
unclassified but difficult-to-access information.”86  This requirement refers to the need to 
orient in a “cultural and demographic jungle of population groups” and the need to 
understand the “physical, human, cultural and informational terrain”87 rather than 
emphasize intelligence that enables direct attacks against key insurgents. 
3. How Does Contemporary Counterinsurgency Relate to the Diamond 
Model? 
While Kilcullen’s observations have obvious implications for the operational and 
tactical execution of counterinsurgency, it is not equally clear that it changes the 
strategies of the Diamond Model. 
The fundamental principle that a counter-state needs to start from nothing and 
grow has not changed.  There might be changes to whether the majority of this growth 
comes from the population or from international actors, but the fact remains that the 
counter-state is dependent on retaining the information advantage in order to grow.  Such  
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an advantage can only be achieved in an effective manner by blending in with the 
population and relying on their passive support.  As Kilcullen states, “the people remain 
the prize.”88  This, of course, is very much in line with the model. 
In theory, there would be a point where the tactics and weapons of the counter-
state were so effective that the fight could be carried out with such small numbers of 
insurgents that the information advantage could easily be retained.  This point does not 
seem to have been reached, but it is worth recognizing that the tactics and weapons of the 
counter-state will have an effect on the dilemma between size and visibility. Future 
insurgents may be able to inflict massive casualties with a very small organization if they 
are able to obtain more effective weapons (i.e., chemical or nuclear weapons) or 
improvised weapons that create similar effects.   
The different end being pursued (i.e., insurgents being spoilers rather than trying 
to take power) is no fundamental departure, either.  It certainly offers the insurgents the 
option of being more decentralized and thus makes it more difficult for the 
counterinsurgents to dismantle their organization.  Nevertheless, an insurgent group that 
acts as a spoiler group will still have to attack the state in more or less the same way as a 
classical insurgency.  Attacking the state is an activity that arguably precedes any 
attempts to organize an alternative government.  As such, a spoiler group can be seen as a 
lesser-included case of a classical insurgency.  
The primacy that Kilcullen places on influencing audiences and “winning the 
story” is not a departure from the model, either.  Strategies 1 and 5 are aimed at 
influencing the population and the international actors to support the state rather than the 
counter-state actor.  Kilcullen’s observations, therefore, are more amplifying than they 
are contradicting. 
For these reasons, the most important aspects of contemporary insurgencies do 
not change the Diamond Model. Thus, the model is a highly useful tool to understand the 
dynamics of, and the countermeasures to, both classical and contemporary insurgencies. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, insurgency conflicts are characterized by an asymmetry in force, 
which favors the counterinsurgent; an asymmetry in information, which favors the 
insurgent; and a battlefield consisting of the population, their perceptions, and their 
support. 
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III. INFORMATION OPERATIONS: MAKING SURE THAT 
THE GOOD GUYS FINISH FIRST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
General Richard G. Stillwell argued that armed “conflict ends, at least 
temporarily, when one side makes the decision that there is more to be gained—or less to 
be lost—by allowing the antagonist to prevail” and that “the side that desists has simply 
lost the will to continue the conflict.”89 The psychological aspect of armed conflict is 
important in all types of warfare, but in COIN the counterinsurgent is not only dependent 
on “breaking the will” of the insurgent, but also on influencing the local populace and 
gaining their support to be successful. Indeed, “the wars of liberation that have erupted in 
the third world over the past four decades document the crucial role of  psychological…” 
aspects in such conflicts and how they shape the final outcome of such conflicts.90  As 
such, this chapter outlines how a counterinsurgent force should address the psychological 
aspects in insurgency conflicts by systematically influencing the perceptions and 
preferences of the actors of the conflict that were outlined in Chapter II. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide general guidelines for how COIN forces should implement 
information operations (IO) in their overall efforts. This will be done by discussing the 
crucial role IO plays in insurgency conflicts and also the components and challenges of 
IO in COIN. 
B. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN INSURGENCY 
CONFLICTS 
Insurgency conflicts “are fought politically and psychologically, with the 
assistance of military capabilities”91 and can, in many ways, be considered a form of 
“armed theater.”92  In this theatrical show the actors, insurgents, and counterinsurgents 
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are locked in combat at the same time that each is playing for a wider audience 
predominantly made up of the local population, but also of external audiences who might 
provide external support or opposition.93 A distressing fact is that public opinion and the 
importance of local public support have repeatedly eluded the attention of 
counterinsurgents throughout history, at least in the initial phases of COIN campaigns. 
For instance, this is very much the case in the ongoing struggle between the Western 
COIN forces and violent jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the political and 
psychological aspects of armed conflict are manifested through public opinion and the 
populace’s support, or lack of thereof, for the adversaries. 
Professor McCormick’s Diamond Model directs that separating “the populace 
from the insurgents [is the key to success and thus] should be a basic objective of COIN 
strategy.”94 Gaining the support of the population is strategy 1 according to the Diamond 
Model, and success in subsequent strategies 2 and 3 of interdicting insurgency 
infrastructure and targeting the core of the insurgency organization is anchored on 
popular support for the counterinsurgent. This coincides with the observation that the 
local population comprise the battlefield in insurgency conflicts and the critical fact that 
the actors (i.e., the insurgent and counterinsurgent) “are competing for the same 
objective: the people” and their support.95  
This quest between the insurgent and counterinsurgent to win the support of the 
population can be viewed as a “war of ideas” and it follows that the goal is to win the 
support and recognition of the population. This involves “far more than neutralizing 
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conventional warfare is [focused on] direct military confrontation between states,” COIN 
campaigns must be focused on the “control and influence of populations, rather than the 
control of an adversary’s forces or territory.”97 
As a matter of fact, “non-kinetic capabilities have a more prominent and 
necessary role [in COIN] than in conventional warfare.”98  The ability to influence both 
adversarial and non-adversarial actors in a systematic and planned manner, or what is 
termed information operations (IO), is imperative to the success of a counterinsurgent.99 
IO directly influences what should be the operational focus of counterinsurgents 
according to the Diamond Model, namely the population and the support they can 
offer.100 While this has been hard for counterinsurgents to recognize and implement in 
past and present conflicts, insurgents, on the other hand, “understand how to leverage the 
information environment”101 and their “choice of weapons [has a strong tendency to] put 
a conventional high-technology force at a disadvantage.”102 
An example of how insurgents have recognized the importance of the population 
is the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the ideological leader of al Qaeda, to Abu Mus’ab 
al-Zarqawi, the former leader of the group now called al Qaeda in Iraq. In this letter al-
Zawahiri stated that “we [al-Qaeda] are in the midst of war, and more than half of that 
struggle takes place on an information battlefield; we are in an information war for the 
hearts and minds” of the population.103  
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1. The General Target Audiences for Information Operations in 
Insurgency Conflicts 
The target audience for information operations in an insurgency conflict can, in 
simplified terms, be divided into three segments: 
 The local population: the most vital target for information operations in an 
insurgency conflict 
 The contending actors of the conflict: the insurgents and counterinsurgents 
 External actors: foreign populations and political entities that might 
influence both the actors and the outcome of the conflict 
Conventional IO doctrine tends to put the emphasis on influencing the adversarial 
decision-maker at the same time as it slights the importance of influencing key non-
adversarial audiences, especially the local population in an insurgency conflict.104 While 
the focus on adversarial decision makers retains a valid role in insurgency conflicts, it is 
crucial that the lion’s share of information operations is targeted at the “constituency of 
the undecided, or the fence-sitters”105 within the local population. 
The local population is faced with the challenge of deciding which of the actors 
they should support. In Chapter II, the authors described the following options/choices 
available to the local population: 
 Support the insurgency 
 Support neither the counter-state nor the state 
 Support the state 
 Support both the state and the counter-state 
Additional aspects, which will influence the choice of the “undecided fence-
sitters,” are the short- and long-term consequences of these options to the individual.  It 
follows that even though the state or counterinsurgents may provide a better situation in 
the long-term for society and the individual in general, the individual’s need to survive in 
the short-term is likely to outweigh the value of long-term improvements.106 As a result, 
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the vast majority of the undecided will be “waiting out progress and security concerns to 
determine who they will support”107 because “when a man’s life is at stake, it takes more 
than [generic] propaganda to budge him.”108 “The victor will be the ones who get them 
off the fence”109 and counterinsurgents should therefore aim to create a favorable 
bandwagon effect by influencing and shaping the convictions of this entity.  
“Breaking the will” of an adversary is important in all types of armed conflicts, 
but even more so in insurgency conflicts. Insurgents seek “to shift the decisive battle 
space from the military to the psychological”110 and it follows that counterinsurgents are 
also required to target the opponent in this battle space.  
Finally, external actors, foreign populations, and political entities are also an 
important audience because they are likely to influence the freedom of action for both 
actors and possibly the outcome of the conflict itself.111 
2. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the Insurgent 
The primary goal of most insurgencies is “to weaken government control and 
legitimacy in the population,” while simultaneously obtaining support for their cause 
through the use of force, coercion, and subversion.”112 The continued existence, growth, 
and potential for success for the insurgents hinge on developing and maintaining a 
relationship with the populace that favors their cause.  
Furthermore, it is important to realize that insurgents are elusive, asymmetric 
adversaries who will use any effective “weapon” within their reach to counter the 
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strengths of the counterinsurgents and take advantage of their weaknesses.113 In a “war of 
ideas,” for the “heart and minds” of the population, information, and propaganda become 
part of the insurgent’s asymmetric weaponry, and as a result the insurgent will “not 
[primarily] seek success on the streets, but in the information environment.”114 
At the same time, it is likely that the ideas and ideology of the insurgents do not 
have a strong foothold within the populace. A common trend is that insurgents are faced 
with both the challenge of justifying their actions, and garnering support for their often 
radical and dangerous movement from a somewhat hesitant community. These 
monumental tasks compel insurgents to use a somewhat-indirect approach to achieve 
their goal of acquiring direct support (defined as people, guns, and money115), and 
indirect support, from the population.  This indirect approach involves a deliberate, 
efficient, and consistent dissemination of their ideological message. To undermine and 
break the “will of the enemy,” the insurgents are likely to utilize asymmetric attacks in 
combination with propaganda targeted at the popular support for the enemy. In sum, this 
requires, according to Robinson, that insurgents must have “an innovative and nimble 
information strategy.”116  
Information is the “commodity with which [the insurgent] purchases cooperation, 
survivability, the perception of victory, and silence,”117 and his information operations 
thus become pivotal means in the effort to gain the necessary support and legitimacy 
within the population.118  As a result, information value and the degree of desired 
influence within the relevant population often trump the military value of kinetic 
operations for the insurgents. In Afghanistan, for instance, the Taliban’s “information 
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objectives tend to drive kinetic [violent] operations.”119 Every kinetic operation “they 
undertake is specifically designed to influence attitudes or perceptions within the Afghan 
population.”120 
In the initial phases of the conflict, insurgents follow no rules, are “not confined 
by the truth”121 and, as a result, they often “reign supreme in the information 
environment”.122 Their ability and tendency to “lie, deceive, and create false causes,” 
combined with inherently-close cultural and social ties to the population, provide them 
with an advantageous position from which to “create propaganda which furthers [their] 
cause.”123 The insurgents’ propaganda works because it is deliberately and carefully 
tailored and attuned to the people’s preconceived notions, and easily conveyed to the 
affected population.124 Still, insurgents are also likely to engage in the instrumental use 
of violence against innocent people and targets of limited or no military value. This is 
commonly defined as terrorism and it is based on “the idea that the virtual impact of an 
act of terrorism [on public opinion] is more important … than the kinetic effects of the 
act itself.”125  
Moreover, insurgents are also likely to utilize a combination of persuasive and 
coercive means to obtain the necessary cooperation and support from the population. 126 
Acts of terror show how persuasion and coercion, in practice, are intimately linked.  
Severe coercion can be used by insurgents, in combination with IO, to influence the local 
populace to create what Leites and Wolf define as an assisted preference for their 
cause.127   
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3. Information Operations: from the Perspective of the 
Counterinsurgent 
Information operations can be defined as a “set of coordinated actions undertaken 
to affect adversary systems and information-based processes while protecting one’s 
own.”128 Conventional information operations commonly encompass the following core 
capabilities within a military organization: psychological operations, military deception, 
operational security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations.129 This 
definition, and the core capabilities that it encompasses, is highly focused on information 
processes within a military organization, and ways to optimize and protect these 
processes in order to gain an information advantage over a military adversary in 
conventional conflicts.  
In a counterinsurgency environment, however, the most vital goal of information 
operations is to influence the public’s perception of the adversary by conveying “a more 
compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative,” thereby discrediting their 
propaganda and deeds.130 The overall objective is to “create divisions” between the 
insurgents and their “mass base” while simultaneously strengthening the sense of 
legitimacy of the counterinsurgents within the population.131 To accomplish this, 
information operations must exceed the more conventional information processes by 
integrating civil-military operations and public affairs into the information-operations 
concept.132  
The U.S. Air Force uses the term “influence operations” to describe information 
operations that “are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, 
groups, or entire populations.”133 Influence operations encompass public affairs, which 
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has not been defined as a core capability in conventional information operations, but is 
considered a subset of information operations. The objective of influence operations is to 
“influence adversary decision-making, communicate the military perspective, manage 
perceptions, and promote behaviors conducive to friendly objectives.”134 The U.S. Air 
Force defines this as “desired effects in the cognitive domain”135 but, in simplified terms, 
this can be translated into winning the “war of ideas” for the “hearts and minds” of the 
population. 
Information operations in COIN should not only be focused on projecting 
messages, but also on denying and degrading the adversary’s messages136 and, although 
terms like “offensive information operations” and “defensive information operations” 
have been discontinued, it is important to recognize that information operations can and 
should be applied for offensive purposes. “Their use will add to the positive effect of 
counterinsurgent operations on public opinion, and serve a defensive purpose at the same 
time by countering insurgent propaganda.”137  
Finally, military deception is a core capability of conventional information 
operations that should also be exploited and utilized by counterinsurgents. Insurgents still 
compose the enemy in COIN and they are potentially just as vulnerable to deception as a 
conventional enemy. Military deception can be defined as “those measures designed to  
mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce the 
enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's inclination,”138 and the main 
objectives are to:139 
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 Provide a commander with the freedom of action to carry out his mission 
by deluding the enemy as to his intentions, and by diverting the enemy's 
intention away from the action being taken. 
 Mislead the enemy and persuade him to adopt a course of action that is to 
his disadvantage. 
 Gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages. 
 Enhance success and, ultimately, save lives of the counterinsurgent’s own 
troops. 
Deception is a useful tool which can act as an enabler and force multiplier if it is 
properly coordinated and incorporated with the overall COIN effort. 
a. Why Use Information Operations? 
The essential role and importance of the population in insurgency conflicts 
account for the fact that such conflicts cannot single-handedly be won by traditional and 
conventional military means. The public’s involvement restricts the spectrum and extent 
of the kinetic operations of the counterinsurgents, and one of the key fundamentals of 
COIN is the concept of minimizing the use of military force.140 Contemporary and 
historic examples, like the conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam, confirm that “it is 
[clearly] possible to conduct a brilliant series of tactical actions with overwhelming force 
and firepower and [still] lose the larger strategic goal.”141  
Information operations, on the other hand, offer a non-kinetic alternative 
that can be used to separate the insurgents from the general population. Information 
operations are not subject to the same limitations as kinetic operations, for example, rules 
of engagements (ROE) or risk of collateral damage, and can be conducted with relatively 
limited economic expense. If information operations are properly embedded in an overall 
counterinsurgency campaign, they have the potential to not only counter the opposing 
information operations of the insurgents, but to also act as an “effect-multiplier” in 
support of the counterinsurgents’ kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. Lastly, information  
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operations can also be conducted as independent operations aimed at shaping public 
opinion and influencing the morale of the insurgent forces. At best, they also have the 
potential to be a vital element in overall population and area control.142 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCIES 
Since insurgencies are people-centric conflicts, the use of traditional kinetic 
operations has more than just physical results.143 “Traditional combat will only comprise 
one part” of the overall effect the counterinsurgent is trying to obtain.144 The other part is 
based on the effects kinetic operations have on public opinion.145 Thus, the intent of an 
operation should not be limited to the kinetic results alone. It should also include 
thoughtful consideration of the long-term effects on the population and on public opinion, 
especially in respect to the public’s support for the counterinsurgent effort over the long 
run.  COIN “strategists and commanders must not only ascertain what they should do, but 
also how the audience will perceive, understand and react to these actions.”146 The role of 
information operations is to shape these perceptions and create the foundation for 
favorable reactions in line with the objectives of the counterinsurgents.147 Information  
operations are ideally mutually supporting and interrelated with all counterinsurgency 
efforts, and systematic integration can facilitate and maximize the potential for beneficial 
long-term effects of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.148  
Information operations should also be employed more aggressively from the 
beginning, so that operations are specifically instigated for the purpose of creating, 
facilitating, and conveying a message to the population. It follows that information 
operations not only can be used effectively in support of other operations, but also should 
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be the main effort of larger multifaceted operations as well. Moreover, when information 
operations are conducted in conjunction with other kinetic and non-kinetic operations, it 
is of paramount importance that the deeds and actions are in harmony with the conveyed 
message, and vice versa, to assure a favorable long-term effect on public opinion. 
When information operations are conducted independently, that is, not in 
conjunction with kinetic or non-kinetic operations, and directed at either the population 
or the insurgents they must still follow the axiom of separating the insurgents from their 
base of popular support and legitimizing the presence and actions of the 
counterinsurgent.149 Independent operations should ideally follow the common principles 
of countering the strengths while exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy’s ideology and 
propaganda.150   
D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES: MAJOR 
CHALLENGES 
The primary concerns of counterinsurgency forces in information operations are 
related to both messages and means of delivery. The success of these operations depends 
on both the content of the message and the medium or channel used to convey it.151 As 
John Arquilla points out, even “the very best wiring in the world simply cannot make up 
for poor wording.”152 Nor can success in conveying a message, via a channel that the 
target audience believes is highly reliable, compensate for a message that is not 
appropriately attuned to that audience.153  
Moreover, a “perfect” message cannot compensate for the use of an imperfect 
medium which reveals that a counterinsurgency operative is the sender. In worst case, the 
                                                 
149 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 5–2, 5–78. 
150 Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al-Qa’ida’s Playbook,” Center for 
Combating Terrorism (2006) 5, digital copy. 
151 John Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” in Information Strategy and Warfare, edited 
by John Arquilla and Douglas A Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 9. 
152 Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy,” 9. 
153 Ibid. 
 45
“perfect” message will “instinctively be treated with the utmost suspicion,”154 and could 
also be “branded hostile and . . .  automatically rejected.”155 It follows that the two most 
significant challenges facing information operatives in a COIN environment are 
achieving access to channels that can convey the message without being automatically 
rejected, and having the ability to adjust the message so that the content is appropriate 
and resonates with the local population. 
E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT: 
GUIDELINES  
COIN operations are characterized by the continuous quest to “favorably 
influence the perceptions” of the local population and attain their support.156 In today’s 
insurgencies, “emotional and political support is gained and lost through the 
interpretation of events rather than the events themselves.”157 Thus, the use of savvy, 
focused information operations aimed at shaping public perceptions and interpretations is 
essential for the success of any counterinsurgency effort.158 First of all, the sine qua non 
to successful information operations in COIN is systematic integration. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of information operations in counterinsurgency operations also “…depends 
on the adherence to four basic rules: a clear cut aim and purpose, a well defined target 
audience, a credible message and a reliable means of communication.”159  
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1. Information Operations: Integration, a Prerequisite for Success 
In COIN, for long-term effects, the way an operation is conducted and 
coordinated with information operations is as important as the isolated outcome of the 
operation itself. Information operations must have a specific purpose and focus within an 
overall plan of action, but at the same time must operate under the same dynamics, and be 
“considered inseparable from kinetic combat operations.” 160 In essence, this implies that 
information operations “must be pre-planned [, integrated,] and deconflicted across the 
spectrum of planning and execution” of all types of counterinsurgency operations.161  
Furthermore, successful COIN requires unity of effort in the use of all means, 
both kinetic and non-kinetic, and because the population is likely to be heavily exposed 
to insurgent influence, this cannot be done by deeds alone. Counterinsurgents must 
demonstrate through a combination of words, deeds, and long-term policies that they 
represent a more compelling alternative to the population than the insurgents. 
Lastly, a thorough integration of information operations throughout the entire 
COIN campaign is likely to have positive synergistic effects that not only enhance the 
execution of other kinetic and non-kinetic operations, but also highlight the positive 
aspects of the counterinsurgency efforts and strengthen the probability of desired long-
term effects.  
2. Information Operations: A Clear-Cut Aim and Purpose 
Separating the populace from the insurgents is a basic objective of COIN strategy 
and commonly recognized as a prerequisite for successful counterinsurgencies.162 Thus, 
the aim of information operations must be derived primarily from the objectives of 
separating insurgents from the population and stemming popular support for the cause of 
the insurgents.   
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The ultimate success in counterinsurgencies “hinges on legitimacy and the moral 
right to govern”163 and the primary aim of information operations, indeed most 
counterinsurgency operations, should be to create the favorable perception of the 
counterinsurgents within the population, which will substantiate the legitimacy for the 
counterinsurgents. In simplified terms, this involves “winning the hearts and minds” of 
the uncommitted majority, namely the “fence-sitters” of the population.  Furthermore, 
information operations must also aim at denying and degrading the adversary’s messages 
and information operations that are targeted at the same segment of the population.164 
The secondary aim of information operations is to “break the will” of the 
insurgents to oppose the counterinsurgents and debilitate the sustainment they receive 
from their cohorts within the population. Lastly, information operations should also be 
aimed at boosting the morale of the counterinsurgents and their supporters within the 
population. 
The main purpose of information operations is, of course, to enhance the 
likelihood of success for the counterinsurgents. This encompasses both the independent 
and isolated effects information operations can achieve, as well as serving the purpose of 
being a “force multiplier” of other, really all, COIN efforts. Nonetheless, “unity of effort 
and purpose in the information environment is vital”165 and a clear-cut aim and purpose 
for information operations are likely to prove insufficient unless both are thoroughly 
comprehended and adhered to throughout the counterinsurgency organization.  
3. Information Operations: A Well-defined Target Audience 
The target audiences for information operations at the tactical and operational 
level in a COIN campaign are primarily the local population, which is the most important 
part, and then secondly the insurgents. The population can be divided into the following 
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three groups: those who support or are part of the counterinsurgency; those who avidly 
support or are part of the insurgency; and those who are uncommitted, which is usually 
the majority of the population.166 The composition of constituencies within the 
population is depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   The Population Constituencies in an Insurgency Conflict (After: Emery167) 
Counterinsurgency operatives use different methods in their information 
operations to target each of the three audiences. In targeting those who support or are part 
of the counterinsurgency, they often use a “conventional type” of information operation, 
one that focuses on information processes within the counterinsurgency organization or 
one that is intended to boost morale. In targeting those who avidly support or are part of 
the insurgency, operatives may use propaganda, psychological operations, and deception 
in an attempt to weaken their will and reduce their capability for opposition. In targeting 
neutrals, which is the uncommitted majority of the population, operatives utilize 
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messages and themes that legitimize the existence and actions of the counterinsurgents 
while simultaneously delegitimizing the insurgents and their propaganda, as well as 
focusing on the benefits of supporting the counterinsurgency effort.  
This method is intended to shift public opinion and entails that information 
operations should be aimed first of all at influencing the perceptions of the “silent 
majority,” namely the uncommitted members of the population and, consequently, 
generating a favorable public opinion of the counterinsurgency.168  
However, cultural and social mechanisms in third world countries are likely to 
suggest that some segments of the population are more important than others, even 
though these segments appear to be less susceptible to the information operations of the 
counterinsurgent. Third-world societies are often tribal and communal in nature and a 
vital catalyst for generating a favorable public opinion depends on the careful assessment 
and achievement of at least tacit support from “the most trusted and most influential 
community members, the societal and cultural leaders” within these societies.169 Given, 
for instance, the general religious adherence of Muslim populations, members of the 
Ulema are by far the most important members of such populations, along with tribal 
leaders and other individuals of societal weight. It follows that the counterinsurgents 
should strive to influence these individuals. The support and cooperation of trusted and 
influential community members have the potential to cause a desired bandwagon effect, 
which means that the support and cooperation of these individuals are likely to cause the 
majority of the communities where they originate from to follow suit and cooperate with 
the counterinsurgents.  
Lastly, the insurgents themselves are also a target audience, but they should be 
exposed to a different type of information operation designed specifically to weaken their 
will power, and thus their capability to oppose the counterinsurgency. This typically 
involves psychological operations (psyops) which, in short, is aimed at stopping the 
insurgents from acting like automated “killing machines and start them thinking again, 
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about their homes, their family, and life in general.”170 It follows that psyops should be 
aimed primarily at lower rank and less-motivated insurgents, in order to turn them away 
from their masters, or hard-core elements of the insurgency, to make them lay down their 
arms and defect. Psyops messages should focus on moral themes and be aimed at 
promoting strong feelings of guilt at the individual level, all in order to weaken the 
insurgents’ resolve, “diminish their will to fight, and undermine their ability to wound or 
take lives; in sum, destroy their effectiveness.”171  
In addition, there is also a potential, and highly favorable, second-order effect of 
defection within the insurgency ranks. In Chapter II, the authors discussed the inherent 
limitations of the Dragonworld and how insurgents would be forced into prioritizing 
security over efficiency in the short-term.  The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) of the 
U.S. Military Academy has used this insight, along with agency theory, to study al-Qaida.  
Given the reasonable assumption that the Dragonworld will influence insurgent 
organizations in the same way that it will influence al-Qaida, the CTC’s model may be 
used on a generic insurgency as well.   
Agency theory predicts that an insurgent organization will face an inherent trade-
off between security on the one hand, and its efficiency or control on the other.172  This 
basic trade-off stems from the need to delegate control and resources while not achieving 
a perfect alignment of preferences between leader and subordinates.173  It follows that 
influencing either of the two variables may change the effect that an insurgency 
organization has. This is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   An Insurgent Organization’s Utility Function (From: CTC174) 
The variable control or efficiency may be decreased if insurgents can safely desert 
the insurgent’s organization.  By causing a steady stream of defections through the use of 
psyops, the insurgency movement will suffer from loss of personnel, competence, and 
material. This will limit the insurgent leadership’s ability to direct operations, as well as 
the overall efficiency of the insurgency movement.   
4. Information Operations: A Credible Message  
One of two major challenges for counterinsurgents when conducting information 
operations is getting the message right.175 The information goal of insurgents is “to be 
first” in supplying information with regards to individual events and the ongoing struggle 
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with the counterinsurgents.176  Rumor-centric societies reward this achievement.177 
“However, being the first with a message is not necessarily a victory, and being second is 
not necessarily a loss.”178 “The rapid dissemination of accurate credible information can 
make or break the counterinsurgents’ effort,”179 but the prime goal of the 
counterinsurgent “should be to be first with the truth”.180 Furthermore, to gain the 
support of the population, the message “must be indigenous in content and execution”181 
and hence culturally-attuned and in accordance with local values and cultural norms.182 
The counterinsurgents must shape and articulate value-based themes to which the 
population can relate and ensure that “all actions of the government and its personnel are 
consistent with—and reinforce—those themes.”183  
The most important messages in counterinsurgent information operations are 
those aimed at convincing the local population that the presence and activities of the 
counterinsurgency are in the best interests of both individual members of society and the 
populace as a whole. Such messages should focus on the potential as well as actual ability 
of the counterinsurgent forces and state actor to facilitate economic, political, and social 
development that is far superior to the often draconian alternative of insurgents.184 
Furthermore, messages must also invalidate the enemy’s exploitation of socio-political 
grievances within the population, pointing out and challenging inaccuracies in their 
ideological interpretations of these grievances, and at the same time emphasizing the 
consequences of violent acts conducted by the insurgents.185 
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Messages that are aimed directly at the insurgents with the purpose of 
undermining their will to fight should focus on their military inferiority and must 
emphasize the image of the counterinsurgent as a steadfast and resolute opponent who 
will never yield. Lastly, to minimize the potential for misinterpretation and the effect of 
counterpropaganda, the messages must be simple, consistent, and truthful.186 
5. Information Operations: Reliable Means of Communication 
The second major challenge for counterinsurgents in information operations is 
how to convey the message in a way that it will not be automatically rejected by the 
target audience.187 To begin, the counterinsurgents should assume that the local 
population may discount most of the information simply because they are culturally or 
politically suspicious of the counterinsurgents.188 Thus, the choice of channels for 
conveying messages must be attuned to the cultural characteristics of the local 
population. In addition to being simple, consistent, and truthful, messages must then be 
repeatedly disseminated through as many channels as possible to assure that they reach 
and are accessible by the target audience.  
In order to make the messages resonate within the local population and prevent 
potential rejection of their contents, counterinsurgents must strive to use local proxy 
sources to convey messages in accordance with the axiom “that the message 
communicated must be indigenous in content and execution.”189 This means not only 
using local channels that shield the true originator, but also framing the messages as 
much as possible in terms similar to the chosen channels’ routine views and perceptions. 
The use of proxies increases the credibility of the message itself, while assuring that it is 
sensitive to the cultural, political, and religious perceptions of the local population. It puts 
a “local face” on the counterinsurgency efforts in general, and helps bridge potential 
cultural and political gaps between the counterinsurgents and the local population.  
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The use of key social and cultural leaders as interlocutors between the 
counterinsurgent forces and the silent majority of the population is particularly important. 
Key leadership engagement is a vital part of information operations in contemporary 
COIN campaigns. It provides the counterinsurgent with an influential channel for 
conveying his message that is likely to be perceived as highly credible by the general 
populace. Furthermore, if the counterinsurgent is able to gain the cooperation of local 
leaders, the cultural foundation of the insurgents may be further weakened.  
F. SUMMARY 
If a counterinsurgency is to succeed, it is imperative that a wedge be driven 
between the insurgents and the local population, and that the allegiance of this very same 
population is shifted towards the cause of the counterinsurgency.190 This cannot be 
achieved by kinetic and coercive means alone. As Al-Baddawi and Mackinlay 
demonstrate, contemporary counterinsurgents must engage as intensely in propaganda 
efforts as they do in a traditional military conflict.191  
The brilliant 19th century military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, argued that 
“public opinion is won through great victories,”192 but great military victories are rare in 
insurgency conflicts. Moreover, “caution must be exercised [in insurgencies] and instead 
of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain 
decisive results with the least application of force and the minimum loss of life.”193 The 
only way “public opinion can be won” is by a systematic implementation and savvy 
exploitation of information operations, which is the most effective and possibly the only 
way to convince the “silent majority” of the population that their personal and national 
interests reside with the counterinsurgent and not with the insurgent.194  
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This requires a major effort on the part of the counterinsurgents. They must 
overcome the challenges involved in developing the appropriate “indigenous” message 
and in successfully conveying this message to the target population without it being 
distorted, misunderstood, or rejected. The use of local proxies can help remedy these 
challenges, particularly if the counterinsurgents can attain the cooperation of local 
societal and cultural leaders. This will greatly enhance not only the credibility of the 
message, but also the likelihood of success for the information operation as a whole. 
While information operations aimed at exploiting the weaknesses and contradictions of 
the insurgency ideology and violence may undermine their popular support, it is just as 
important to inaugurate a favorable perception of the counterinsurgency.  
Moreover, a counterinsurgent force must align its actions with the messages being 
propagated through information operations, which emphasize the attitudes and 
perceptions the counterinsurgents seek to establish within the local population. Doing this 
involves shifting the major focus of COIN operations from combating insurgents to 
addressing the local population’s grievances and challenges. Merely good intentions and 
deeds are likely to prove insufficient. In current and future counterinsurgency campaigns, 
it is the use of skillful information operations that may prove to make “the difference 
between victory and defeat.”195 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NATION-BUILDING FOR COIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Diamond Model prescribes broad strategies for the counterinsurgent.  In the 
long-term, an effective execution of strategy 1 (securing the population) requires a 
security system that is not only capable of providing physical security to the population, 
but also of acting upon information from the population, conducting criminal 
investigations, avoiding the pitfalls of corruption, sentencing according to a legitimate 
law, and carrying out those sentences as decided by the courts.  Similarly, it may require 
substantial reform in national or local government practices, as well as the services the 
government provides, in order to influence the true preference of the population.  An 
insurgency that is able to persist and grow is a testament to a state’s failure, and the 
transformation of this state, as well as its civil society, is therefore part of the removal of 
the root causes of the insurgency. 
The broader task of transforming the state and its civil society therefore provides 
a framework in which COIN has to take place.  This framework has implications for the 
execution of COIN.  The purpose of this chapter is to elicit the major principles that 
occur as a consequence of operating within a larger framework of transformation, and 
then add these principles to the already-established understanding of how to counter an 
insurgency.  The combined requirements will later form the basis for formulating a 
Norwegian model for counterinsurgency. 
Since this thesis addresses the question of how to use the Norwegian Armed 
Forces in a counterinsurgency abroad, it seems useful to separate the efforts that lead up 
to going after the insurgency, from the efforts to reform various parts of the state and 






(COIN), as this is mainly what classical counterinsurgency theory deals with.  The 
second type of effort has been termed civil counterinsurgency (civil COIN) in a RAND 
counterinsurgency study.196   
The tasks that fall within civil COIN can also be said to be part of what is 
described as nation-building.  The RAND study states that the tasks in civil COIN and 
nation-building are essentially the same, but that the environment in which civil COIN is 
conducted gives rise to special requirements.197  These special requirements mainly 
concern the need to have a standing capability, as well as an ability to deploy and operate 
during hostilities.  The literature that discusses these tasks primarily falls under the 
nation-building term, which is the reason for choosing nation-building rather than civil 
COIN as a reference point in this chapter. 
Dobbins understands nation-building to involve “the use of armed force as part of 
a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of 
transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its 
neighbors.”198  Similarly,  
Multiple terms have been used to describe operations that generally fall 
under the category of post-conflict reconstruction. These include nation 
building, state building, stability operations, stabilization and 
reconstruction, security and stability operations, transition, transitional 
authority, trusteeship, phase IV warfare, peacekeeping, peace building, 
and peace operations.199 
The term nation-building therefore covers a very broad set of processes, and like 
Dobbins, the authors will use the term broadly.   
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In some instances, the execution of nation-building introduces requirements to 
COIN that may seem to conflict with the most effective way of carrying out the tasks of 
the latter.  One example can be the efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) 
former fighters.  DDR is an important means in COIN because it drains the 
counterinsurgent of weapons and people.  From a nation-building perspective, however, 
the need to quickly establish jobs (for instance, within the state apparatus) might 
undermine efforts to create an effective state apparatus and fight corruption.  Certainly, 
giving exclusive benefits to former fighters might trigger negative responses from the 
ones that do not benefit from such programs and increased recruitment for the insurgency 
is thus a negative, but nonetheless a possible result of such programs.  
The subject of this chapter then is to discuss the most important of these tensions 
and their implications for conducting COIN.  These tensions can be divided into three 
categories. 
First, assuming that the host nation has military and law enforcement forces, there 
is a balance to be struck between the use of international and host nation forces.  Given 
the opening condition that there is an insurgency, the host nation is presumably unable to 
handle it on its own.  Relying on international forces might mean more advanced 
weapons and doctrine, may give benefits of command and control, can reduce friction 
resulting from language problems inside the COIN organization, may promote 
intelligence sharing, etc.  Use of local forces might therefore introduce an ostensible 
efficiency reduction.  On the other hand, local forces have local knowledge, speak the 
language, and are ultimately necessary to legitimize the host nation government.   
Military forces are widely used in nation-building efforts; they are deployable, 
can provide for their own security, have built-in and trained command and control 
functions, etc.  At the same time, many tasks in both COIN and nation-building are 
inherently within the law enforcement domain.  The second balance to be struck is 
therefore between the use of military and law enforcement forces. 
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Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are normally present in the trouble spots 
of the world.  These organizations deliver important services, but they depend on 
distinguishing themselves from the intervening forces in order to benefit from their image 
as neutral actors.  This distinction is increasingly blurred as the intervening forces deliver 
the same services as the NGOs.  At the same time, it is evident that a nation-building 
effort might require substantial deliveries to the civilian population.  The third tension is 
therefore the balance between the interveners’ directed reconstruction efforts, and the 
NGOs’ voluntary assistance. 
In addition to these tensions, this chapter also lists a few requirements where 
armed forces have no major role, but where they still need to observe and adhere to these 
requirements. 
B. BALANCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL FORCES AND HOST 
NATION FORCES 
The natural propensity for an intervening force to curb an insurgency is to rely on 
its own personnel, equipment, and procedures, and thus create a parallel structure to any 
host nation security forces.  The process of merging these two structures is a complicated 
one, and this section attempts to shed some light on when and why this should be done, 
rather than how. 
1. Exploiting the Golden Hour 
Dobbins argues that a golden hour can arise in the wake of an external 
intervention into a society in disorder.200  This golden hour is a situation that is “highly 
malleable.”201  It can last for a few weeks following the end of major combat operations, 
and is the result of shock and relief among the population, disorganized resistance, and 
uncertainty for potential spoilers.202  In other words, the golden hour can be seen as  
 
 
                                                 




preempting an insurgency through kick-starting nation-building efforts.  It follows then 
that the golden hour can and should be exploited to shape the situation and consolidate 
the intervening powers’ authority.203   
Several obstacles may make this exploitation difficult.  First, the nature of an 
intervention by a foreign power gravitates towards a gradual build-up of forces.  The 
forces first in place are likely to be combat forces, and therefore not necessarily the forces 
most fit to take advantage of the golden hour.  A complete deployment of the intervening 
forces might take weeks to accomplish, during which the possibilities of the golden hour 
disappear. 
A second obstacle is the fact that the golden hour is likely to occur at a time when 
the intervening powers have not yet been familiarized with the host nation and its 
population.  The likelihood of misinterpreting signals and misjudging situations is 
therefore comparatively higher in this time period than later on. 
The third factor is the status of the host-nation security forces.  Although these 
could provide the numbers, force composition, and local knowledge necessary, they are 
likely to be either discredited by the local population or in a state of disarray. 204  
Exploiting this golden hour means that intervening powers must overcome these 
obstacles.  Instead of relying on a gradual build-up of forces, a wide array of forces must 
to be ready to start working almost simultaneously.  This is not limited to military forces 
only, but also “police, civil administrators, and humanitarian workers, followed quickly 
by judicial and penal experts.”205  This naturally puts great demands on prior planning 
and coordination.  As will be discussed later, these forces need to be of sufficient size to 
fill the void in the host nation. 
The second obstacle is traditionally a major problem for conventional military 
forces conducting a counterinsurgency campaign.  Historically speaking, the most 
successful COIN forces have been those that have focused on interacting with the 
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population rather than utilizing large unit formations and massive firepower.206  Galula 
argues that COIN forces should be divided into static and mobile units, where the static 
units should live among the population in order to understand the local situation and the 
needs of the population.207  This indicates that to the extent that conventional military 
forces are being used, these should be reoriented for COIN prior to their deployment.208   
The third obstacle requires that the counterinsurgent has resources and flexibility 
to rebuild local security forces quickly.  This task includes facilitating the selection 
process, vetting, and the training of forces.  Depending on the situation, this may be done 
within the structure of existing security forces, or entirely new personnel may be 
recruited.209  Additionally, there is a need for monitoring newly-commissioned forces in 
their daily conduct. 
The need for exploiting the golden hour therefore calls for a broad intervention, a 
well-connected organization, and well-trained, prepared forces. 
2. The Importance of Using Local Security Forces 
General Richard Stillwell presents an argument that on the surface seems to run 
counter to Dobbins’ argument.210  One of Stillwell’s truisms for counterinsurgency is that 
the “message communicated must be indigenous in content and in execution.”211  
According to Stillwell, a successful counterinsurgency is contingent on using primarily 
local security forces.  His point of view seems to be that the legitimacy of the government 
has to be built by the government itself, not by an external agent.  The role of foreign 
forces in a counterinsurgency campaign is therefore to act as advisors.212 
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One can of course argue that Stillwell based his discussion on experiences from 
the Philippines in the 1950s and the Vietnam War, none of which reached the level of 
disintegration seen in failed states over the last two decades, and subsequently that his 
argument does not extend to recent cases.  While this is a fair argument, Stillwell’s main 
thesis is that the use of local forces will influence and facilitate the creation of a 
legitimate foundation for the state.  Regardless of the state of affairs in the host nation, 
that seems to be true on two different levels.   
First, the state needs to be perceived as useful for its population; that is, present a 
more attractive solution than the counter-state.  According to Stillwell, the use of local 
security forces is one of the best tools a state possesses to demonstrate such utility.213  
Use of host nation security forces therefore improves the legitimacy of the state as long 
as they are seen as useful.  In this respect, international forces may act on behalf of the 
state, but they are rarely confused with the state itself.   
Second, even though the host nation state may use foreign forces to support 
efforts to establish a secure environment, it still needs to demonstrate that its own 
apparatus will be capable of governing effectively in the future.  Foreign forces may add 
to the capability and capacity in an interim period, but this added capability and capacity 
have to be replaced by indigenous forces over time.  Johnson and Mason demonstrate the 
importance of this point through the Taliban’s use of intimidation:   
They [the Taliban] are fond of saying, ‘‘The Americans have the 
wristwatches, but we have the time.’’ The simple message they deliver in 
person or by ‘‘night letter’’ is one of intimidation: ‘‘The Americans may 
stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually they will leave, 
and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every family 
that has collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government.’’214 
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Put in another way, the counter-state can outlast an intervening international force 
without outfighting it.  As demonstrated by the Taliban, a persuasive argument can be 
made by claiming that the counter-state will win as long as is it able to avoid a complete 
defeat.  A similar argument against competent host-nation security forces will resonate to 
a much lesser degree, because the element of time is no longer a determining factor.    
3. Implications for Counterinsurgency 
The implications of using local security forces for counterinsurgency will 
naturally depend on the circumstances.  However, a few general observations based on 
the conflicting interests above can be made. 
First, exploiting the golden hour has the potential of marginalizing the power of 
local and transnational spoilers.215  This, however, requires the intervening power to 
project a near complete force package for the nation-building effort at the time of 
intervention, or alternatively at the conclusion of major combat operations.  The 
counterinsurgent component of this force package needs to act quickly with 
overwhelming force (i.e., in terms of numbers, not in terms of violence) in order to 
establish law and order and thereby consolidate its power position.216 
It is evident that a successful nation-building effort requires effective host nation 
security forces to be established.  For the counterinsurgent to succeed, the population 
needs to actively support its government by providing information.  As described in 
Chapter II, such active support requires the absence of immediate threats from the 
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The role of the host nation security forces is therefore to establish an impression 
of itself as the ultimate winner of the contest with the counter-state.   
At the operational level in small wars (insurgencies), however, credibility 
becomes fundamental. All actions must serve to create and sustain 
credibility in the eyes of the supported populace or government. 217 
As such, effective host nation security forces are part of the end-state for an intervening 
power. 
Also, it is of course necessary to establish an impression of the state as the 
preferred option, absent of any threats.  Stillwell suggests that civic action is the most 
suitable means to such an end.218  Assuming that the likelihood of creating this favorable 
impression is reduced the longer the counter-state puts up an effective fight, it follows 
that effective host nation forces need to be established as soon as possible. 
Apart from exploiting the golden hour, the role of the intervening power is 
therefore to provide conditions under which immediate threats are absent, as well as 
developing host nation security forces as quickly as possible.  It is also clear from the 
discussion above that this role should only cover tasks that the host nation security forces 
are not able to do.  In a choice between a host nation security force and an intervening 
force that are equally capable at a task, the host nation security force is clearly the better 
option.  Given the need to establish the host nation security force as a potent and capable 
force, one should probably be willing to stretch it even further.  T. E. Lawrence advised 
such an approach in his 27 articles. 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it 
tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them.219 
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The ability to exploit the golden hour depends on a rather massive foreign 
intervention that is capable of handling most tasks by itself.  This, however, should not be 
an excuse for not starting immediate work towards developing host nation security 
forces.  As such, there is no conflict between the arguments of Dobbins and Stillwell.  
Seen together, they prescribe a solution with a broad and complete force package with the 
weight on the intervening power initially, where the weight is distributed to the host 
nation security forces as quickly as possible. 
C. BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
FORCES 
The ratio between military and civilian components is related to the challenges of 
balancing the use of international versus local forces.  The recent interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the important realization that COIN is not only 
executed within the military domain.  Civil COIN aside, it is even fair to argue that 
classic COIN theory postulates that COIN is more in the law enforcement and civil 
domain than it is in the military, as “a revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 
80 per cent political.”220 
Nevertheless, the combined requirements from deployment, self-protection, and 
sheer numbers have ensured heavy military presence in most COIN campaigns over the 
last decades.   
1. Numbers in Stability Operations 
Chapter II demonstrated that there is a need for security forces to prevent 
insurgents from threatening the population into an assisted preference that favors the 
counter-state.  Further, given the opening condition that insurgents can move among the 
population without being identified, it follows that the size of the population, in contrast 
to the size of the insurgency, is the primary determinant for the size of the security forces 
needed. 
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A few studies of the size of forces necessary to establish a secure environment 
have been carried out.  Quinlivan’s study from 1996 remains the seminal work on this 
topic.221  According to this study, a security force ratio of one-to-four per thousand 
inhabitants is fitting for a society at peace.222  Such ratios have also been observed in UN  
operations and in Germany after World War II.  Dobbins et al. see ratios around (or 
sometimes below) one per thousand inhabitants as suitable for situations where the 
contenders have exhausted themselves and are ready to cooperate.223 
Quinlivan asserts, “Force ratios above ten members of the security forces for 
every thousand of population are not uncommon in current operations […].”224  The 
counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya had a ratio of about 20 per 1,000 inhabitants and 
Northern Ireland saw similar numbers.225  In 2007, coalition forces in Iraq numbered 
169,000, which equaled a ratio of 6.3 per thousand inhabitants.226  If the Iraqi army and 
the Iraqi police are added to this number, the ratio increases to 18.4 per thousand 
Iraqis.227   
In a more updated study of international peace enforcement operations, Dobbins 
et al. found an average of 13 international soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.228  It seems, 
therefore, that Quinlivan’s estimate of 10 to 20 security force personnel per 1,000 
inhabitants is reasonably validated in recent operations.  The number of 20 per 1,000 
inhabitants has been accepted as a benchmark estimate for force requirements where 
security needs to be enforced.229 The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have adopted this 
view: 
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Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 
counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counter-
insurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop 
density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed 
ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.230 
The important understanding from these ratios is the force numbers they generate.  
Quinlivan makes an important observation when he states that an intervention might 
require rapid stabilization of the capital, entry ports, and other major cities. If not, the 
legitimacy of the intervening force is likely to drain away as control remains elusive.231  
The growth of cities over the last decades can make this a very tall order.  For example, 
the UN estimates Kabul’s population to be just below 3 million people.232  Using the 
ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants yields a requirement for 
approximately 60,000 security personnel to secure Kabul alone. 
Sixty thousand is a big number, even for a coalition of several nations undertaking 
such an effort.  According to NATO, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan currently commands 55,100 troops, which is spread over the entire 
country.233  It follows that an intervention in a reasonably small country can be a 
challenge even for a coalition.  As the participating nations are required to contribute 
civilian COIN personnel at the limit of what they are able to, use of military forces 
becomes an inevitable solution.  Additional requirements from the need to deploy, sustain 
the force, endure security risks, etc. only justify the use of military forces.   
As a side point, large nations “are simply not candidates for stabilization by 
external forces.”234 Pakistan currently estimates its population at approximately 166 
million people.235  Using the same ratio of 20 per 1,000 inhabitants means a security 
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force consisting of 3.3 million personnel.  Similarly, Iran’s current population of 
approximately 70 million people236 would require a security force consisting of 1.4 
million personnel.   
2. The Paradox of Force 
As discussed above, the struggle between the state and the counter-state is 
ultimately one of legitimacy.  As Galula puts it, “in the final analysis, the exercise of 
political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, 
on its submissiveness.”237  If the population does not view the state as preferable to the 
counter-state in the long-term, efforts to prevent the counter-state from influencing the 
assisted preference of the population will be a waste of time.  Should it come to that 
point, the state is left with the options of either giving up or coercing its population into 
submissiveness.   
The role of military or police security forces then is to provide an environment in 
which a state can both transform and deliver the services that are required.  If this is 
primarily what the security forces are used for, their composition should reflect the nature 
of this task.   
The need for personal safety is a deep-rooted need in human nature, and providing 
for public safety is therefore a key goal.  Such public safety should ensure that economic 
and social relations are maintained.  This task includes patrolling streets, guarding key 
buildings and infrastructure, detaining suspected criminals, and countering drug 
traffickers as well as other organized criminal groups.238 
Military forces are perhaps suitable for tasks at the simplest end of the spectrum, 
such as guarding key infrastructure or establishing checkpoints.  Beyond the basic level, 
however, it seems obvious that police forces are more suitable.  That is certainly the case 
for tasks such as investigations, questioning, collection and preservation of evidence, etc.  
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Dobbins et al. describe responsiveness and accountability as key goals for 
building legitimacy.239  Responsiveness refers to the police’s ability to react to cues from 
members of the public, not just from the government.240  A security force that is 
responsive to the public ensures that members of society can count on assistance in a 
short time.  Further, it is a strong indication that the security force is working for all 
factions of the public, as opposed to being an instrument to be used by the 
government.241  The command and control structure in combination with inherently large 
formations make military forces poor at this.  Time-sensitive targeting has become very 
important as part of the global war on terror, but this still refers to the ability to react to 
situations within a timeframe that is extensive when compared to day-to-day police 
operations. 
Accountability refers to the police’s “submission to and acceptance of outside 
supervision.”242  An accountable police force demonstrates that police work according to 
the law rather than the government, and in this way it builds legitimacy.243  As military 
organizations are designed primarily for fighting wars, the operational decision-making 
processes and bureaucratic procedures are not designed for revision and external control 
at every step. Rather, a military organization is geared towards use of force in critical 
situations, which is normally not subject to subsequent revision.  While targeting at the 
operational level might resemble the rigidity and accountability seen in law enforcement, 
the nature of military forces is still to plan based on uncertain intelligence and 
assumptions, and act upon crude indications and possibilities.  It follows, therefore, that 
the police is a better fit for public order tasks and for building legitimacy through 
responsiveness and accountability.   
 
                                                 






Beyond public order and law enforcement, the picture becomes more blurred.  
There is clearly a place for small and precise military raids, but these should not be the 
main focus of the counterinsurgent.244  Instead, there should be a focus on conducting a 
census, implementing movement control of people and goods, public information, 
intelligence gathering, etc.245  All of these tasks indicate that the focus needs to be on 
interaction with the population, rather than exclusively seeking out and fighting the 
insurgents.  In determining the mix of military forces, police forces, and civil 
administration, several factors are important.  First, the threat level is obviously central.  
A high threat gravitates towards military forces, while a low threat will favor police 
forces and enable civilian administration.  Second, the training and competence of the 
personnel entrusted with the task is obviously also important.  This indicates that to the 
extent that military forces are used for these tasks, special training is required.  Finally, as 
Galula points out, a military force imposing control on a local society can more easily be 
exploited by insurgent propaganda, as it can be pointed out that the government has no 
other means to execute their task besides relying on the armed forces.246  A corollary to 
this is the insight that the more force and coercion the state uses, the less likely it is to 
gain its legitimacy.247 
3. Implications for Counterinsurgency 
The first important implication for COIN is the fact that a force needs to be 
relative to the population it is dealing with.  As Quinlivan points out, there is normally a 
need to quickly bring certain key areas under effective control, and this requirement 
drives the force requirement for the counterinsurgent. 
In the continuation of operations, Quinlivan’s insight means that a 
counterinsurgent needs to be present in sufficient numbers wherever he decides to be.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter II, this requirement goes beyond daytime presence.  A situation 
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where the counterinsurgents rule by day and the insurgents rule by night is equal to no 
control at all, as the insurgents will be able to access and intimidate the population.248  A 
logical fallout of this insight is the need to have local counterinsurgent forces in place all 
the time (i.e., live and operate locally). 
Given that there is likely to be a shortage of forces compared to the favorable 
ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, an oil-spot approach might be the 
only possible compromise between necessary force numbers and the need to bring the 
entire country under control.  An oil-spot approach means that the counterinsurgent will 
gradually expand into new areas only when previously engaged areas are considered safe. 
The quest for legitimacy presents multiple requirements to the counterinsurgent.  
First, for many tasks related to interaction with the population and law enforcement, 
police forces are inherently more suitable than military forces.  Dobbins et al. see 
gendarmerie forces, which combine elements from civil and military police, as an ideal 
solution.  Such forces, however, are in short supply as only a few nations keep them.249  
Second, to the extent that military forces are necessary, they need to be trained for their 
task and observe the need for responsiveness and accountability.  This places a strong 
demand on forces to live and operate locally.250 
The place for raids and operations against the insurgents then is both second in 
priority to, and dependent upon, the efforts geared towards gaining legitimacy.  As Galula 
succinctly put it, “Nevertheless, conventional operations by themselves have at best no 
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D. BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECTED RECONSTRUCTION AND 
VOLUNTARY EFFORTS 
In recent years, the tension between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
military forces has become more pronounced.  The fact that the number of NGOs has 
increased in the later years is obviously a contributing factor.  Further, and perhaps even 
more importantly, military forces have entered the domain of aid workers by distributing 
humanitarian aid, thereby potentially depriving NGOs of their neutrality and security.  
1. NGOs Must be Distinguished from the Counterinsurgent 
Since the mid-19th century, it has been an honored principle to grant access for 
humanitarian aid in armed conflict.  This principle was later adopted in the Geneva 
conventions, and is founded on the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants.252  By being truly neutral actors, NGOs have therefore had a humanitarian 
space to operate within.  This humanitarian space has given NGOs access to most armed 
conflicts, and enabled humanitarian aid to be distributed to the victims of war. 
It follows then that as soon as a NGO is associated with one party to the conflict, 
the neutrality is broken.  Such association can for instance be a result of a NGO 
collecting intelligence for one party.  The consequence is of course that the opposing 
party no longer will honor the principle of unrestricted access, and the NGO will not be 
able to perform its desired tasks without risk to its personnel.253  A related argument 
often put forward by NGOs is that only impartial parties should provide relief.254  A 
counterinsurgent, on the other hand, is likely to direct aid towards winning “hearts or 
minds” or some other goal.255  For these reasons, most NGOs are unable and unwilling to 
cooperate with the intervening powers.   
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The utility of a humanitarian aid organization needs no other justification beyond 
the aid it is providing.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the value also from a 
counterinsurgency point of view.  NGOs are often present early in the conflict, are 
normally collectively present over a large area, have tried and tested methods of bringing 
in supplies, etc.  Combined, this means that NGOs can provide vital support to large 
portions of a distressed population, which in turn may help the counterinsurgent in the 
effort to bring about a secure and stable environment. 
Even though a NGO might be able to operate in its humanitarian space, it is still 
dependent on the larger security situation.  The security situation will have both direct 
and indirect effects on what NGOs attempt to accomplish.  Efforts may be directly 
affected when the population is prevented from travelling to or utilizing the services 
provided.  The security situation may also indirectly affect NGO operations through, for 
example, unavailability of goods or labor.   From a NGO standpoint, therefore, security 
forces should put all their effort into providing security, while NGOs should focus on 
humanitarian work. 
2. All Reconstruction Efforts Need to be Coordinated 
Against this clear-cut divide between NGOs and the counterinsurgent is the need 
to coordinate efforts.  “Fragmentation, gaps or duplication in aid-financed programs” is a 
problem in virtually all humanitarian relief efforts.256  This ultimately leads to key 
priorities not being addressed.257  The Utstein study had similar findings for peace 
operations, and indeed, most COIN theory postulates a need for a unity of effort, precisely 
in order to ensure a coordinated approach to the most important objectives.   
Further, it seems obvious that the host nation state apparatus’ means to achieve 
legitimacy is delivering basic services.  This might include such services as access to 
clean water, electricity, basic health care, basic education, and clearing of minefields.258  
Moreover, early in a conflict or in high threat areas, COIN forces may also be the only 
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ones in a position to provide humanitarian relief.259 This, of course, brings the 
counterinsurgent into the domain of many NGOs. Even though NGOs are important, it 
would be putting the cart in front of the horse if protection of NGOs prevented the host 
nation from reasserting its rights and responsibilities.  
The urgency of these questions is addressed above under the need to exploit the 
golden hour.  From the point of the counterinsurgent, therefore, there is an urgent need to 
coordinate with NGOs in order to succeed at an early stage.    
An often overlooked point in this dilemma is the meaning of impartial, as this 
effectively defines the humanitarian space.  It seems evident that this is at least as much a 
judgment that the belligerents have to make as it is a defined standard.  If one party does 
not see a NGO as impartial, it is not likely to grant it the access it requires.  In the past, 
actions like providing electricity or basic education may not have been very 
controversial.  In today’s religious-ideological conflicts, however, this question is very 
much contested.  This is amply demonstrated by the Taliban’s violent campaign to 
destroy schools, and in particular those for girls.  Another example can be found from 
NGOs working with judicial reform, which is equally contested.260  A third case in point 
is the fact that the intervening powers often choose to channel post-conflict assistance 
through various NGOs261, and thereby in some sense make the NGOs agents of the 
intervening powers. 
From this insight, it follows that not all NGO activities properly belong in the 
humanitarian space.  The problem then is how to ensure that the ones that do provide 
impartial relief are not confused with the ones that do not.  The NGOs’ solution of 
implementing a categorical divide between NGOs and the counterinsurgent may be as 
wrong as the strong desire for the counterinsurgent to coordinate efforts. 
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3. Implications for Counterinsurgency 
A few general observations can be made.  It seems to be necessary to distinguish 
between the components of the counterinsurgent force that are made up of international 
actors and those made up by the host nation itself. 
First, the international components of the counterinsurgent forces should take 
steps to see that the local population does distinguish between NGOs and international 
COIN elements. Using uniformed personnel and material is a simple and powerful means 
of differentiation.  Similarly, military personnel should avoid riding in NGO vehicles and 
socialize with NGO personnel, and vice versa.  Furthermore, collocation of facilities 
should also be avoided.262 
A separation in time may also be acceptable.  As long as security has not been 
established in a particular area, NGO activity may be limited to purely humanitarian aid.  
As soon as the area has been secure, however, the full panoply of NGOs may be allowed 
to work.  In this way, a clearer separation is kept as long as the security threat is 
significant.  Incidentally, such an approach fits well with the oil-spot approach 
recommended above.  
It also follows that the same counterinsurgency forces need to show restraint on 
activities that belong to the humanitarian sphere.  From the discussion above, it is 
obvious that a counterinsurgent can and should provide aid in order to take advantage of 
the golden hour.  The same is true in areas where there are no humanitarian 
organizations.  If those requirements are not fulfilled, however, the most prudent solution 
seems to be to distribute aid and other forms of assistance in close partnership with the 
host nation’s apparatus.  The host nation, as opposed to the international component of 
the counterinsurgent forces, should have no restrictions on what reconstruction efforts to 
undertake or what aid to distribute. 
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Second, the counterinsurgent should avoid using NGOs as its implementing 
partner in various projects.263  This principle should also extend to the intervening 
powers and other donor states.  Instead, COIN forces should route resources through the  
host nation government to implement its policies.  While this may include less oversight 
and efficiency, it does improve the capacity and legitimacy of the host nation 
government.264  
The level at which such interaction takes place is dependent on how capable the 
host government is.  Exploiting the golden hour means that delivering results is at least as 
important as building up capacity to govern in the short-term.  The transfer of large funds 
at the top of a broken hierarchy is therefore likely to be a poor solution, as it will not 
produce the desired effects.  A workable alternative might be to allocate funds and work 
with local authorities at the lowest possible level initially, and then gradually leave 
oversight of lower echelons to their host nation government as capability improves.   
Third, achieving unity of effort between numerous Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IGOs), NGOs, counterinsurgent forces, and the host nation government 
might prove far harder than maintaining a differentiation between the counterinsurgent 
and the NGOs. Such a unity of effort might be achieved where there is a unity of 
command, for instance in a UN operation.  Where such unity of command does not exist, 
however, unity of effort will be far more elusive.  Given that no formal command 
relationship can be established, any coordination and cooperation will have to be based 
on a voluntary basis.  Dobbins suggests the establishment of a civil operations center.265  
The purpose of this would be to provide all participants with a common meeting ground 
and thereby the means to develop a common understanding of the tasks that have to be 
carried out.  A different RAND study proposes a shared network, namely an integrated 
counterinsurgency operating network (ICON).266  The idea of such a network is similar 
to Dobbins’, namely that an attempt to achieve unity of effort between disparate 
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participants is best served through sharing information.  This fits well with Kilcullen’s 
insight, which is the following: “In modern counterinsurgency, secret intelligence may  
matter less than situational awareness based on unclassified but difficult-to-access 
information.”267 Kilcullen also seems to agree that the road to unity of effort goes 
through information sharing between all actors.268 
E. OTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 
In addition to balancing the interests described above, nation-building introduces 
other requirements to the counterinsurgent that also have an impact.  This impact, 
however, is arguably less than that described above.   
Controlling inflation is one such need of the process of nation-building.  A high 
inflation rate will discourage investments and impede the capital market, and thereby the 
long-term goals of the whole process.269  As the counterinsurgent will buy services 
locally and perhaps even pay for civil servants, it is important to size wages and salaries 
to the per capita gross domestic product.270 In this way, inflation is not encouraged, and 
the set wage level is sustainable in the long-term.   
A second requirement is to help prevent corruption.  Reducing the level of 
corruption is critical in building legitimacy for the state.271  Establishing reliable and 
sufficient payment for security forces and civil servants is an obvious requirement for the 
counterinsurgent.  Similarly, the counterinsurgent needs to establish open and transparent 
processes for contracting local services and goods.272  As described earlier, it is important 
to use the host nation government to the fullest extent possible for handling contracts that 
are in the domain of government services. 
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Third, experience shows that NGOs and international military forces often 
employ a substantial portion of well-educated host nation individuals.273  Since these 
individuals often speak English, they are in high demand for roles as drivers or 
translators.  This practice does not only lead to an unsustainable income level for this 
category of personnel, it is also a significant brain-drain for the formation of a new 
state.274  It seems evident that this category of personnel could be better used for other 
purposes than driving and translation.  Thus, the counterinsurgent needs to show restraint 
in depriving the new state of qualified personnel.  Solutions can be found either in 
educating COIN personnel in language and culture or starting language courses for local 
citizens who can serve in roles where no higher education is needed. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the need for the counterinsurgent to engage a society 
with an insurgency problem with sufficient numbers to quell the fighting.  This requires 
not only combat forces, but also a wide array of other types of personnel and resources 
able to start working at an early point.  As a second dimension, a substantial effort has to 
be made in providing for proper law enforcement. 
In combination, these two first dimensions prescribe a development from an 
initial weight on international military forces towards a situation where local law 
enforcement forces dominate.  This development can be depicted as follows in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   Desirable Development of Security Forces Over Time 
This chapter has also argued that achieving unity of effort with NGOs is difficult, 
but that some degree of coordination may be achieved by creating a common 
understanding of the situation in the host nation.  The counterinsurgent should not use 
NGOs as contracting partners.  Instead the local government should be asked to carry out 
the same tasks.  The important ramification of this is that the counterinsurgent forces 
should be prepared to act as a channel for funds from the intervening powers to the host 
nation government.  Such funds may need to be distributed locally at first, and then 
gradually higher up in the host nation government system as its capability and capacity 
improves. 
Finally, the security component of the counterinsurgent force also needs to 
support the wider effort to fight inflation, corruption, and prevent depriving the host 
nation state of qualified personnel.  These objectives can be achieved through prudent 
policies on spending, contracts, and hiring of local personnel. 
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V. NORWEGIAN CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the Norwegian government confirmed in Parliamentary Bill 48 that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces are a vital instrument to secure Norwegian interests not only at 
home, but also abroad.275 Furthermore, the bill emphasizes that the challenges of the 
contemporary global security environment are multifaceted and that NAF, as a result, are 
just one of several means to protect and secure Norwegian interests internationally.276 
However, to optimize the overall effects of Norwegian efforts to strengthen international 
security and the credibility, influence, and political integrity of Norway as an 
international actor, the bill argues for a more comprehensive approach with regards to the 
use of NAF abroad.277 Lastly, the bill confirms that the use of NAF in international 
military operations and interventions within a UN or NATO framework is an integrated 
part of the Norwegian defense and security strategy.278 It follows that NAF must be 
prepared to participate in COIN operations or COIN-related missions in the future. 
This chapter will address the structure and capabilities of NAF. The aim is to 
identify the opportunities and limitations of NAF with regards to how COIN should be 
conducted, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI.  The theory discussed in 
Chapter II (Diamond Model), Chapter III (the necessity and role of IO in COIN), and 
Chapter IV (the implications of nation-building for COIN forces) will be used as a 
framework for identifying the limitations and opportunities of NAF in a COIN 
environment. Furthermore, this chapter will also address some key Norwegian non-
military means and the level of coordination and unity of effort that is required to achieve 
the stated goal of optimizing the overall effect of all Norwegian efforts. Insurgencies take 
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place on land and it follows that COIN campaigns primarily revolve around land 
operations. As a result, the authors will focus on the elements within NAF that directly 
operate on land and/or can directly support and influence the actors of the Diamond 
Model as identified in Chapter II. 
B. NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES 
The Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine states that the purpose of land 
operations is:  
To hold and control areas of land, or to seize and defend these with the 
aim of combating an adversary, stabilizing the situation between 
conflicting parties or protecting the civilian population, infrastructure and 
own forces. Control of territory is also a precondition for humanitarian aid 
and other measures which over time can improve conditions in the conflict 
area.279   
Even though this describes the purpose of generic land operations, it encompasses 
and identifies operational elements that are vital to successful COIN operations. Yet, 
while the definition as such is not sufficient to implement a successful counterinsurgency 
effort, it does provide an overarching concept that can be used for COIN if augmented 
with a set of more detailed guidelines specific for such conflicts. Then again, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces are by no means new to low-intensity conflicts and military 
operations outside Norwegian borders. 
1. Norwegian Military Operations Abroad 1951–2009 
The first deployment of NAF elements as part of a multilateral coalition was a 
light field hospital (NORMASH) as part of UN operations in Korea from 1951 to 1954. 
This mission was followed by deployments of combat, support, and staff units to UN 
missions in Gaza, Egypt from 1957 to 1967 and the Congo from 1960 to 1965.280 The 
next major deployment of NAF elements abroad was as part of the UN International 
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Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. The participation in UNIFIL lasted until 1998, and 
even though Norway deployed different kinds of military units ranging from a light field 
hospital to a helicopter unit, its main contribution was a battalion-sized infantry unit. 
NAF also took part in the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). All of Norway’s 
military operations abroad, in the period from 1951 to the early 1990s, were conducted 
under UN auspices.281 
The end of the Cold War brought not only changes to the global security 
environment, but also to the Norwegian perceptions of how NAF could and should be 
perceived as a vital tool of Norwegian foreign policy. In the period since 1991, the 
Norwegian government has shown a greater will not only to take part in NATO and 
coalition-led operations outside what is defined as the Euro-Atlantic area,282 but also to 
expose elements of NAF to a higher degree of risk than in previous international military 
operations. In the mid 1990s NAF were highly involved with combat forces in the 
Balkans, and in 1999 Norwegian special operation forces (SOF) were among the first 
NATO units to enter Kosovo. In the post-9/11 era, Norway has taken part in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan with combat forces since 2002. Norway also deployed an engineer unit, a 
naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit, and a small element of staff officers 
tasked with training local Iraqi counterparts in the initial stages of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF).  
Nevertheless, the current use of NAF in international military operations still 
retains characteristics that were prevalent in the period leading up to 1999. First, the use 
of NAF outside Norwegian borders has always been within a coalition where other 
countries or international organizations, predominately NATO and the UN, have acted as 
framework nations or entities. The Norwegian government states in Parliamentary Bill 48 
from 2007 that deployment of NAF is only feasible within a multilateral framework and 
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this will also be a prevailing factor in future deployments of NAF abroad. 283 Second, 
past history and current use of NAF abroad suggest that different types of units and 
capabilities, to include purely staff and support elements, are likely to be deployed as part 
of a larger international coalition with a limited time perspective and few expectations 
with regards to achieving a purely Norwegian effect.  Third, the number of failed, or 
failing, states and the increased Norwegian will to use NAF outside the Euro-Atlantic 
area implies that NAF must be prepared to operate in semi-permissive and hostile 
environments and take part in COIN operations in the future as well. 
2. Ground Force Elements of NAF  
The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine argues that the function 
of land forces in a joint and combined military operation is “territorial control over time 
and close interaction with the actors in the conflict area.”284 Furthermore, the doctrine 
emphasizes the importance of a persistent presence of soldiers on the ground in order to 
gain “access to first hand information”285 related to the “parties in a conflict and other 
factors that affect the operation.”286 Finally, the doctrine also accentuates that land forces 
influence an adversary’s freedom of action “directly and indirectly” by use of both “lethal 
and non-lethal” means.287 
A long-term presence of ground forces aimed not only at providing security, but 
also at establishing a close rapport with the local population, is the foundation of strategy 
one in the Diamond Model. The doctrine also correctly identifies the importance of 
gaining “access to first hand information” to counter the information advantage of the 
adversary in a counterinsurgency environment. Furthermore, the doctrine identifies the 
important role of non-kinetic means with regards to limiting “the adversary’s freedom of 
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action and affecting his will and capability” to resist the efforts of a counterinsurgent. As 
such, the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine reflects a basic 
understanding of how to counter an insurgency. However, the constant presence of 
ground forces, as part of a COIN campaign, is a resource-demanding affair. Therefore, it 
is necessary to address the size, quality, and capabilities of Norwegian ground forces to 
properly identify the possibilities and limitations, and consequently what realistically can 
be expected of NAF in a long-term COIN setting.    
3. The Norwegian Army 2009 
The main element of the Norwegian Army is its independent mechanized brigade, 
known as Brigade Nord (Brig N). This unit consists of two mechanized maneuver 
battalions, one light infantry battalion, and conventional combat support (CS) and combat 
service support (CSS) units (engineer, artillery, logistics, and medical units). The 
Norwegian Army has at its disposal a Border Guard battalion; His Majesty the King’s 
Guards, which is a battalion-sized unit; a battalion-sized Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) unit; and a CIMIC Company. In 
addition, the Norwegian Army also has a SOF unit, namely the Norwegian Army Special 
Operations Command (NORASOC).288 
The Border Guard and His Majesty the King’s Guards are tasked with purely 
national duties. This excludes these units from being deployable abroad or function as 
significant manpower sources for such missions. NORASOC is also required to retain a 
minimum of its manpower on call in Norway to handle purely national missions. In 
addition, approximately half of the manpower/units in Brig N are busy with basic training 
of conscripts at any given time. This leaves the Norwegian Army with at best two 
maneuver battalions of combat forces available for missions abroad. In addition to this 
are elements of NORASOC, CS and CSS units, and the CIMIC Company. In essence,  
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this means that the Norwegian Army will probably struggle to maintain a long-term 
contribution to an international military operation and international-led COIN campaigns 
that exceed a company-sized element of combat troops.  
However, the CIMIC Company is an example of how the Norwegian Army does 
possess other types of assets and/or niche capacities that can have vital roles and the 
potential to make a difference in joint military operations abroad, especially in a COIN 
setting. Engineer units, for instance, can be of incomparable value when rebuilding 
infrastructure and tending to the basal needs for clean water and a sufficiently working 
sewer system among the local populace in many third world countries. Mine clearance 
capacities and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are also often in high demand in war-
torn countries. Norway has a long-standing history and reputation of highly professional 
mine clearing personnel, and Norwegian Army mine clearing teams were used in the 
initial phases of both OEF in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq.  If 
such units are used to improve the security of the populations in third world countries 
they are likely to create favorable perceptions of the international military presence 
among the local populace. Lastly, medical units can also have invaluable effects in a 
counterinsurgency environment if they are able to provide medical services to the local 
population that otherwise would be scarce or non-existent.   
Nevertheless, the numerical limitations of the Norwegian Army direct that 
contributions to joint COIN campaigns will not only be limited primarily to a tactical 
level, but also characterized by lack of personnel and units to sustain the long-term 
commitments necessary in COIN. Still, NAF also have certain units and elements in the 
other service branches that can mitigate the numerical limitations of the Army and thus 
help sustain long-term Norwegian presence if needed. This has occurred in the past, and 
the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Meymameh, Afghanistan, has 
for instance previously been manned with personnel from the Norwegian Navy. At the 
time of writing, this unit also has an element made up of personnel from the Norwegian 
Home Guard, a reserve service branch that is organized and trained along somewhat 
similar lines as the U.S. National Guard. 
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4. Potential Assets for COIN Operations in the Norwegian Navy, Air 
Force, and Home Guard 
The Norwegian Navy has within its ranks three units that are highly suitable for 
COIN operations. The Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando 
(NORNAVSOC) is a battalion-sized unit highly capable and trained in land operations. 
Elements of this unit have been deployed along the same lines as elements from 
NORASOC, primarily as part of OEF and ISAF in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the 
Norwegian Navy also has its own Naval ISTAR unit, regularly identified as the coastal 
rangers. This is a company-sized unit, primarily trained for land operations in the coastal 
waters of Norway. This unit has also been used to man the Norwegian PRT in 
Meymameh, and proved themselves to be highly confident and well-qualified for such 
tasks. Lastly, the Norwegian Navy also contains an EOD unit, the mine clearance divers, 
which clearly can contribute to land-based operations. This was for instance the case in 
2001, when a team from this unit was deployed to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). The unit was a part of operation Task Force Harvest (TFH), a 
NATO operation, aimed at facilitating peace talks between the Macedonian government 
and the Macedonian branch of the UCK, as well as the ensuing disarmament of the UCK. 
In the post-9/11 era, the unit has been deployed to Afghanistan as part of OEF as well as 
to Iraq as part of OIF.  
The Norwegian Home Guard has at its disposal thirteen “rapid reaction forces,” 
which are battalion-sized units trained and organized along the lines of light infantry 
units, but with no generic mobility or fire support. Their mission is to be “capable of 
deployment at short notice to support the exercise of sovereignty, national crisis 
management and assist the civil power in maintaining public security”289 in Norway. 
Home Guard personnel have all been through at least six months of basic training and are 
required to go through yearly training to maintain their readiness. Furthermore, 
substantial parts of the personnel within these units have previous experience from 
regular service within NAF and operations abroad. At the time of this writing (2009), 
there is a military observation team (MOT) currently working for the Norwegian PRT in 
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Meymameh, which is predominately made up of personnel form the Norwegian Home 
Guard. With a total number of almost 5,000 men, the “rapid reaction forces” of the Home 
Guard must be considered as a viable source of manpower for NAF operations abroad.  
However, there are important limitations that must be taken into account. First, 
the Home Guard units are not combat units per se and the deployment of complete Home 
Guard units above troop/platoon level cannot be considered a viable option due to lack of 
mobility, firepower, and joint operational training. However, the deployment of team-
sized elements embedded within regular Norwegian units like the current MOT team in 
Meymameh appears to be an auspicious, but currently unexplored source for NAF 
operations abroad, to include COIN operations. Second, personnel in the Home Guard are 
not subject to the same regulations as regular service members within NAF. They have 
regular civilian jobs and as such all deployments of Home Guard personnel to operations 
abroad must be based on voluntariness. The result is that Home Guard personnel must be 
individually recruited and then go through a phase of specifically designed 
familiarization and preparation training, for instance team level, before they can be 
deployed. 
The Norwegian Air Force must also be considered when addressing possible 
sources of manpower and units for NAF operations abroad, including COIN operations. 
Clearly, helicopter units have a vital role in all contemporary military operations, but they 
have limited effect in a COIN environment, except for medevac and logistical duties. 
However, the Norwegian Air Force does have guard units that are deployable abroad, 
primarily for force protection duties. Such units could thus either relieve army units that 
could be used for more active duties in a COIN environment or ease the current 
operational toll on the army units.  
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5. Strategic and Operational Land Force Command and Control 
Elements within NAF 
The Norwegian Army has a Mobile Tactical Land Command (MLTC), which is 
considered to be a part of its operational capabilities.290 In essence, this is the staff 
element of the mechanized brigade, Brig N. However, this staff has not been utilized in 
international military operations and it is likely that they will not be deployed, unless 
Brig N, or at least major elements of the brigade, is deployed abroad. When NAF units 
are deployed abroad they are embedded within a multilateral framework, like for instance 
ISAF in Afghanistan, and are thus subject to the operational lines of command and 
control within such organizations. When the size of NAF elements that are deployed to 
any given operational theatre reaches a certain threshold, typically at or above company 
level, Norway in general establishes an independent staff element, designated the 
National Contingent Commander (NCC). 
The NCC is organized along the lines of a miniature brigade staff and is not a part 
of a multilateral command and control structure. In many ways, the NCC Chief is the 
superintendent of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. In addition to being the supreme 
representative of all NAF units and personnel within the theatre of operations, he is also 
the “red card” holder with regards to Norwegian national caveats that direct which type 
of operations NAF units can conduct. Besides maintaining national lines of 
communication, assessing potential future use of NAF units within the theatre of 
operations, and the “red card” duty, the NCC is to a limited degree involved in the day-
to-day operations of Norwegian units. 
6. Future Deployments of NAF Units to Land Operations Abroad 
In the 2007 budget for NAF, which was released in 2006, the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defense stated that the number of personnel in the Norwegian Army was to increase in 
order to achieve a goal of being able to simultaneously sustain two company-sized NAF 
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elements in separate operational theaters.291 Once this threshold of personnel was 
achieved, it was also expected that the Norwegian Army would be capable of sustaining a 
battalion-sized unit abroad, over a period of three to five years.292  However, less than 24 
months later, the Ministry of Defense had toned down their ambitions and stated that the 
current level of Norwegian land forces was too high to be sustained over time.293 At the 
time, NAF had approximately a company-sized element of combat forces deployed 
abroad, SOF units set aside. In addition, NAF also had smaller elements with niche 
capacities deployed and were, for instance, manning the PRT in Meymameh.  
The Norwegian government correctly recognizes that Norway will never be able 
to provide the number of forces that other larger countries are able to provide to 
multilateral operations abroad.294 As such, it appears that future Norwegian land force 
contributions with regards to long-term COIN operations, like the one currently taking 
place in Afghanistan, will not exceed the level of a company-sized unit. It follows that a 
unit of that size and capability, even though they are tasked with independent COIN-
related missions, must be embedded within a joint or foreign command and control 
structure. Furthermore, it is also implied that such units will be operating at the tactical 
level within an overall COIN campaign, which will have implications on the way 
Norwegian units conduct IO and deal with issues of nation-building.  
In addition, the Norwegian government also asserts that Norway will contribute 
adequately through high quality forces with the ability to not only operate within, but also 
enhance a joint operational environment.295 This is partly ensured by the contribution of 
Norwegian niche capacities like EOD, mine clearance, and SOF units. However, the 
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limited size of these units directs that they cannot sustain long-term commitments on 
behalf of NAF within their fields of operation, and in certain cases such units have been 
deployed abroad for periods lasting less than six months. It follows that the influence and 
effect such units have on long-term goals and development in a COIN environment must 
be considered as limited.  
7. NAF and Information Operations  
The official Norwegian perception of IO is that “Military Information Operations 
are employed to support the achievement of political and military objectives in any given 
operation”296 and Parliamentary Bill 48, 2008, argues that IO should be perceived as a 
strategy aimed at coordinating “military activities in the information sphere.”297 Within 
NAF the role and utility of IO is somewhat more specified. The joint operational doctrine 
of NAF argues that the objectives of information operations are to: 
 
1. Influence the adversary at command level; that is to say influence the 
leaders’ perceptions, plans, actions, and will to continue combat. 
2. Influence the adversary’s decision processes, that is to say destroy, 
degrade, interrupt, deny, mislead and exploit weaknesses in the 
adversary’s decision processes, information and information system. 
3. Develop and maintain a correct awareness of the situation, protect own 
and allied decision processes, information and information systems. 
4. Influence any third parties and others so that they support our operation. 
5. Keep non-combatants and neutral organizations informed so that they can 
cooperate more easily.298 
 
The doctrine also recognizes the importance of “centralized planning and 
decentralized execution” of IO in order to “ensure synchronization and coordination with 
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other operations.”299 If the Norwegian Joint Doctrine gives a reasonably accurate picture 
of how IO is perceived and conducted, and the authors of this study believe it does, then 
IO has a “conventional” focus and is primarily “enemy centric” in its execution within 
NAF.  Influencing “third-parties,” which according to the doctrine encompasses the local 
population, is a goal for Norwegian IO, but the role of the local population in general is 
perceived as subordinate to that of the enemy and the importance of internal information 
processes. Based on the discussion in Chapter II related to the counterinsurgent’s 
information disadvantage, it follows that the local population should be the prime target 
for IO in insurgency conflicts. As such, it can be inferred that the role of the local 
population in contemporary conflicts in general and COIN operations specifically is not 
sufficiently recognized in the Norwegian perception and execution of IO.  
Furthermore, based on the authors’ experience and general impressions, IO is 
neither implemented as a career field within NAF on tactical and operational levels, nor 
perceived as a vital element of planning and execution of military operations at these 
levels of command in general. At the tactical level, however, the authors believe that 
officers and soldiers recognize the second- and third-order effects their actions have on 
the perceptions and opinions of non-combatants, especially the local population in a 
COIN environment. However, when it comes to systematic long-term planning, 
coordination, implementation, and execution of IO within Norwegian units and NAF in 
general, the authors assume there is a significant potential for improvement. 
C. NON-MILITARY  
As Chapters II through IV have made clear, military forces are not the only tools 
needed for a successful counterinsurgency campaign.  This section outlines the potential 
for comprehensive counterinsurgency operations within the scope of the Norwegian 
government. 
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1. Coordination Mechanisms at the Various Levels 
a. Strategic Level 
Given the nature of comprehensive operations, coordination has to take 
place between various departments of the government at the strategic level.  Such a 
mechanism is in work today, as it has been implemented as a department coordination 
forum at the deputy minister level in order to coordinate Norwegian efforts in 
Afghanistan.300  The fact that the coordination is carried out at such a high level 
obviously gives a lot of bureaucratic clout.  Nevertheless, a government study points to a 
crucial point when it states that the complexity of comprehensive operations far outrun 
what an ad-hoc coordination forum can handle.301  While the coordination mechanism is 
powerful, it is therefore also very limited in what questions it can address.  The same 
government study proposes that a permanent capacity for these kinds of questions should 
be established within the Prime Minister’s staff.302  Such a solution would obviously go a 
long way to alleviate the shortfall should it be implemented. 
A related point is the established government policy of relying primarily 
on the UN.  If the UN is providing an integrated mission framework for an intervention, 
the need for strategic coordination at a national level is reduced.  There will of course still 
be questions that have to be decided at a national level, but much of the day-to-day 
questions will have to be handled by the UN.  As such, much can be achieved by simply 
responding to the recommendations and requests made by the UN.   
 
                                                 
300 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007–2008), 60. 
301 Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU), NOU 2008:14, Samstemt for utvikling? Hvordan en 
helhetlig norsk politikk kan bidra til utvikling i fattige land, [Norwegian official studies 2008:14, 
Coordinated for development? How a comprehensive Norwegian policy can contribute to development in 
poor countries], 160, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/NOU-er/2008/nou-2008-14.html?id=525832, 
(accessed April 7, 2009). 
302 Ibid. 
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b. Operational Level 
Taking a step down to the operational level, the means for coordination 
are limited.  If, however, a Norwegian Embassy is functioning in the country where the 
COIN campaign is to take place, that Embassy is of course a candidate to coordinate all 
Norwegian efforts. 
It is worth noting, however, that this capacity may be very limited.  After 
years of focusing on Afghanistan as one of the most important foreign security issues, the 
Norwegian Embassy in Kabul numbers no more than ten individuals.  Compared to the 
operational level headquarters of ISAF, which employs more than 1,800 personnel,303 it 
seems obvious that an Embassy cannot be very detailed in its oversight of 
counterinsurgency efforts.  If one accepts as a premise that a counterinsurgency operation 
is likely to take place in a failed or failing state, a Norwegian Embassy may not be 
functioning at all.   
                                                 
303 NATO, “ISAF headquarters,” ISAF Web site, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/hq/index.html, 














Figure 6.   Capitals without Norwegian Embassy Presence (Blue Triangles) Over the 
Failed State Index Score (Color of Countries)304, 305 
 
                                                 
304 The fund for peace, “Failed states index 2008,” 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140, 
(accessed April 13, 2009). 
305 Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Web site, “Norske 
utenriksstasjoner,” http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/org/utenriksstasjoner.html?id=524467, 
(accessed April 16, 2009).                                                                                                                         
The colors on the various nation-states indicate the failed state index score of 2008.  Blue triangles and 
attached labels indicate the countries where Norway does not have an embassy.  Oslo-based embassies are 
depicted as no embassy presence.  Embassy-offices are treated as embassies. 
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Given the stated policy that foreign interventions have to be carried out 
through some sort of framework, preferably the UN, a limited capacity might 
nevertheless be appropriate.  In such a case, the Embassy would not carry any 
responsibility for either planning operations in the near term or overseeing current 
operations, namely tasks that occupy a majority of the resources in a military 
headquarters at the operational level.  A case in point could be the Norwegian Embassy in 
Kabul that interacts with the Afghan government, the UN and other IGOs, Norwegian 
military forces, and Norwegian NGOs.  An important part of its mission seems to be to 
make recommendations and decisions regarding the use of funds authorized by the 
Norwegian government.  By doing so, Norway maintains some flexibility and the ability 
to solve problems experienced by Norwegian contributors.  As an example, the 
Norwegian Embassy in Kabul keeps two employees stationed with the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, ensuring that Norwegian funds are spent on 
projects that are perceived as important in that province and in accordance with the stated 
policy.  
If a Norwegian Embassy is not present when a COIN campaign is 
initiated, the Norwegian Armed Forces could be given the task of coordinating all 
Norwegian efforts at the operational level.  It should be noted, however, that such a 
solution is not likely to go over very well with Norwegian NGOs and possibly not with 
policymakers either.   
A more likely solution then is that the operational level coordination will 
have to be shouldered by the framework organization alone (i.e., the UN, NATO etc.).  
This solution naturally gives less possibility for pursuing national goals as well as 
remedying shortfalls experienced by the forces on the ground. 
c. Tactical Level 
At the tactical level, a limited capacity has been established and used.  The 
Ministry of Justice and the Police has established a pool of personnel that can contribute 
in state-building efforts abroad, primarily oriented towards programs concerning the rule 
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of law.306  This pool was established in 2004, originally with the purpose of supporting 
the UN, the OSCE, and the European Union.307  Currently, the pool consists of forty 
individuals with specialties as judges and prosecutors (military and civilian), as well as 
personnel with expertise within prison systems.  A few individuals from this group are 
currently working in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and together with the PRT in the Faryab 
province.  Previously, the pool has been used in the Balkans, Georgia, and Armenia.308 
In addition to this pool of personnel, Norwegian police have also been 
used in international operations since 1989.309  Such contributions have mainly been part 
of the UN-administered international police force (civilian police).  Currently, the 
Norwegian government has expressed a goal of keeping one percent of the Norwegian 
police force in peacekeeping operations at any time.310  The Norwegian police currently 
employ around 12,000 persons, 8,000 of which are police officers.311  Depending on how 
the one percent goal is calculated, it should provide a pool of 80-120 police officers 
available for international operations. 
Both of these capabilities, the pool of experts as well as the police, are 
highly relevant for future COIN operations.  At the same time, it seems clear that the 
capacity is very limited.  The implications of the limited numbers are discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
2. Use of Non-governmental Organizations 
Norway also has a long tradition of funding NGOs through its foreign aid budget.  
While a fair amount of this funding might be expected to be used for humanitarian aid, 
some of it is also used for purposes that would fall within the domain of nation-building.  
                                                 
306 NOU, Helhetlig norsk politikk, 2008:14, 154. 
307 NOU, Helhetlig norsk politikk, 2008:14, 154. 
308 Utenriksdepartementet, [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] “Styrkebrønnen, well of 
strength,” www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/well/strength.htm, (accessed April 9, 2009).  
309 NOU, Helhetlig norsk politikk, 2008:14, 154. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Politidirektoratet [The Norwegian National Police Directorate], “The Police in Norway,” 12, 
www.politi.no/downloads/060404_thepoliceinnorway.pdf, (accessed April 14, 2009). 
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The Norwegian Refugee Council is the largest recipient of aid funding from the 
Norwegian government.312  In Afghanistan, the Norwegian Refugee Council trains 
lawyers, judges, and community elders in property law.313  It has also assisted the Afghan 
Ministry of Education with developing a new training program for teachers.314  The 
second largest recipient of aid, the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), is also heavily 
involved in Afghanistan.  The NCA has a wide of array of programs, some of which 
address the issue of improving governance or promoting women’s rights.315  The point 
here is not to undermine the critical humanitarian aid provided by these organizations, but 
rather that these NGOs are also important implementation partners in the Norwegian 
government’s policy in Afghanistan.   
An important insight in this regard is that “so much of peace-building is 
implemented with NGOs that extended dialogue with them is a strategic necessity.”316  
As long as NGOs have a prevalent role in counterinsurgency theaters, (beyond 
humanitarian aid), the same must also be true for counterinsurgency operations.  At the 
very least, such an extended dialogue has to be conducted at the strategic level when the 
funds are distributed.  Therefore, the government has a powerful tool in its ability to  
prioritize where the foreign aid goes.  Whether this tool is being utilized or not is beyond 
the scope of this discussion, although one may assume that there is some unrealized 
potential. 
While NGOs have adapted their efforts to comply with the government’s 
development assistance policy, it is clear that policy is also developed in 
cooperation with the NGOs. The organisations maintain that there is little 
pressure to pursue goals other than their own. The authorities exert an  
 
                                                 
312 Norwegian Agency for Aid Development (NORAD), “Norwegian development aid in figures,” 
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=12461&V_LANG_ID=0, (accessed April 9, 2009). 
313 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Facts about NRC’s country programme,” 
http://www.nrc.no/?did=9169435, (accessed April 14, 2009). 
314 Ibid. 
315 Norwegian Church Aid, “Country Programme Plan, Afghanistan,” 
http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Geografiske%20filer/Asia/KN-NCA-
AFG-Afghanistan-Country%20Plan-2005-2009-rev%202007.pdf, (accessed April 14, 2009). 
316 Utstein study, 59, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-
rapp104.pdf, (accessed May 21, 2009). 
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influence through the guidelines for applications for funding and the fact 
that funding is more readily available for priority themes and countries. In 
the long term this leads to mutual influence and adaptation, whereby the 
differences between public and NGO policies are erased.317 
Nevertheless, a few general observations can be made.  First, the Norwegian 
government needs to consider whether or not to use its funding of NGOs as a potential 
component of a counterinsurgency effort.  If so, the use of foreign aid needs to be seen in 
conjunction with the goals of a counterinsurgency campaign.  
Second, its ability to prioritize and direct the effort of various NGOs will to a 
large degree depend on the detailed knowledge and understanding that flows from the 
tactical and operational levels.  As the discussion above shows, the bottleneck seems to 
be at the operational level. The weaker this level is, the more difficult it will be to direct 
the effects of foreign aid.  
Third, foreign aid funds intended for counterinsurgency theaters may be 
distributed with the condition that some sort of coordination is carried out with other 
Norwegian assets at the operational and tactical levels.  This is obviously a contentious 
issue, as several Norwegian NGOs have been very critical of coordination with military 
forces.  Chapter IV discussed how such coordination might be achieved. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Several factors shape how the Norwegian Armed Forces need to think about 
counterinsurgency operations.  First of all, there is a trend towards using NAF outside the 
Euro-Atlantic area as well as in operations with a higher physical risk than has been 
observed previously.  This trend has become apparent in the post-9/11 era and is driven 
by Norway’s security interests.  As such, the trend is likely to continue and means that it 
is likely that NAF will also be used on counterinsurgency operations in the future. 
 
                                                 
317 Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ”New roles for non-governmental 
organisations in development cooperation,” 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2006/New-roles-for-non-
governmental-organisations-in-development-cooperation/4.html?id=420467, (accessed April 14, 2009). 
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Second, it is a stated goal of the Norwegian government to emphasize the use of a 
comprehensive approach wherever NAF are employed.  It is an important constraint that 
such future deployments will have to take place within a broader framework, such as 
NATO or preferably the UN.  The present use of forces as well as other government 
resources in Afghanistan, however, shows that there is also the ability and will to use 
national channels to work comprehensively in focused areas. 
Third, there are severe limitations on any Norwegian military contributions to 
counterinsurgencies.  The Norwegian Army will have problems with maintaining a 
contribution of combat forces that exceeds a company-sized element in the long run.  It 
should be noted, however, that there is a pool of personnel available from other parts of 
NAF that might be used to augment and improve sustainability, provided that time and 
money is set aside for training, equipment, and preparation.  Also, there are niche 
capabilities within the NAF that are highly relevant for COIN operations.  These 
capabilities include special operation forces, EOD units in both the Army and the Navy, 
engineer units, medical support, etc.  The history of NAF deployments, the professional 
level of soldiers and officers, and the general doctrine in place suggest that there is a 
promising foundation for the development, implementation, and successful execution of a 
more detailed doctrine for COIN operations. 
On the information operations side, however, experience and capabilities are 
largely absent.  It is also worth noting that the Mobile Land Tactical Command or the 
NCC concept could provide a means for the Norwegian government to coordinate 
counterinsurgency efforts at an operational level.   
Fourth, outside the military realm, there are some Norwegian resources suited for 
comprehensive counterinsurgency operations.  Given the policy aim of relying on a larger 
framework, the strategic and operational level resources might be sufficient even though 
they are very small.  In Afghanistan, the Norwegian Embassy has played an important 
role and demonstrates one way of achieving operational level coordination.  In relying on 
such a solution, however, it should be noted that Norwegian Embassies are not present in 
all the trouble spots of the world, necessitating a backup concept where there is no  
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Norwegian Embassy or where the Embassy’s resources themselves are severely limited.  
At the tactical level, there are resources and policies in effect that can produce a viable 
civilian component of a Norwegian counterinsurgency effort. 
Last, the Norwegian government has a long history of using NGOs as 
implementing partners for foreign aid programs.  Presently, this practice is used in 
Afghanistan.  The use of foreign aid is therefore an important, albeit controversial, tool 
for implementing a comprehensive approach in counterinsurgencies. 
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VI. THE NORWEGIAN MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop and describe a conceptual framework 
that should be used by NAF in counterinsurgency operations. In previous chapters the 
authors have outlined and discussed what an insurgency is and what the principles for 
counterinsurgency are: information operations and the important role they play in a 
counterinsurgency environment; nation-building and common challenges related to this 
process for counterinsurgent forces; and finally, the limitations and opportunities of NAF 
in international long-term counterinsurgency efforts/operations. As such, we have not 
only outlined core theory on COIN in general, but also addressed the military means 
available for the Norwegian Government with regards to participation in 
counterinsurgency operations.  
The way NAF should conduct COIN should be a product of the means available 
and the objectives, goals, or ends that Norwegian decision makers want to achieve with 
the use of these means.318 It is imperative that there is an appropriate “balance among the 
objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available” and 
“ends, ways, and means” must be perceived “as part of an integral whole.”319  “That is 
ends, ways, and means must be consistent.”320 As such, the way Norwegian Armed 
Forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations321 must be derived from the means 
at hand for the Norwegian government and their stated objectives or ends.  
Furthermore, the overall scope of this study is to provide a theoretically informed 
policy advisory for NAF and the authors will incorporate the theoretical principles 
outlined in previous chapters as they provide cardinal guidelines for the choice of way or 
method for Norwegian COIN.  
                                                 
318 H. Richard Yarger, Towards a theory of strategy, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm, 
(accessed April 24, 2009). 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
321 This is the general research question stated in Chapter I of this study. 
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In this last chapter, the authors will initially identify and discuss stated and 
official goals for the use of NAF, as well as associated non-military means, in 
international military operations abroad. Then they will introduce a generic model for a 
comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency that will be used as a point of departure 
for discussing and deriving a conceptual framework for how NAF should conduct COIN. 
The authors' aim is to address the implications of their generic model on the way NAF 
should conduct COIN and also identify palpable guidelines aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of NAF in COIN operations. Finally, based on their discussions/study, the 
authors will provide a set of recommendations for how NAF should prepare for and 
conduct COIN operations in the future.  
Stated and official objectives, or ends for the use of NAF, as well as non-military 
means, in COIN-related missions will not be subject of any discussion with regards to 
their validity or feasibility. The purpose of identifying official Norwegian goals and 
objectives is similar to the authors' discussion on NAF structure and capabilities, namely 
to create an appropriate underpinning and framework of understanding for the choice of 
method for how NAF should conduct COIN.  
B. NORWEGIAN ENDS 
At the strategic level, NAF are considered a vital means for the Norwegian 
authorities to strengthen the credibility, influence, and political integrity of Norway as an 
international actor.322 It follows that future participation in “multinational peace 
operations and international defense cooperation”323 within the framework of NATO and 
the UN is not only a stated goal of the Norwegian authorities, but also perceived as a vital 
and integrated part of Norwegian national security policy and foreign policy.324 
 
                                                 
322 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007–2008), 12. 
323 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], Norwegian Defence 2008,  5–7. 
324 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007-2008), 10–35. 
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Norwegian authorities state that desired ends should direct the choice of means 
and ways in peace operations and that military means alone, even though they might be 
readily available, cannot effectively assure success.325  Norway has taken on a leading 
role with regards to the development of multilateral and integrated peace operations 
within the U.N. framework.326 The goal is to establish a “comprehensive approach” 
where both military and non-military means are coordinated and interconnected, and 
mutual parts of the overall strategic effort.327 It follows that a vital goal is to maximize 
the overall and synergistic effect of both Norwegian military and non-military means in 
future operations.328 
The limited size of NAF is also recognized by the authorities, as they 
acknowledge that Norway will never be able to commit large numbers of military forces 
abroad. However, a stated goal is that Norway must contribute with military units that are 
not only of high relevance and quality, but also able to enhance and strengthen 
multilateral cooperation in international military operations.329 Furthermore, it is also a 
stated goal that NAF should draw personnel, units, and capacities from all services with 
regards to military operations abroad. The rationale is that this will enhance the 
possibility of long-term commitments by NAF.330 Lastly, Norwegian authorities also aim 
to reduce the number of military commitments abroad and focus on as few operational 
areas as possible in order to maximize “…the operational effect of scarce [military] 
resources.”331  
                                                 
325 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, Forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007–2008), 61. 
326 Ibid., 36. 
327 Ibid.  
328 Ibid., 61.  
329 Ibid., 35.  
330 Ibid., 61.  
331 Ibid.  
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Insurgencies are people-centric conflicts and victory “hinges on legitimacy and 
the moral right to govern,”332 or put in other words, success depends on which of the 
adverse parties the population decides to support. It follows that the overall and generic 
aim for NAF at operational and tactical levels in COIN operations must be to enlist active 
support from the population. To achieve long-term effects it is vital that the active 
support provided by the population is a result of true preferences rather than assisted 
preferences. That is, that the populace wants to support the counterinsurgent in contrast to 
being compelled into supporting him.333  
In order to attain support and be prone to true preferences from the population, the 
counterinsurgent must be perceived as a more favorable option than the insurgency 
movement. This presupposes that COIN forces are able to “create and sustain security 
and manage political, economic, and social developments within the local population,”334 
all of which should be vital sub-objectives for NAF at the operational level.  
At the operational and tactical levels in COIN, credibility is also a vital aspect of 
the process of establishing true preferences towards counterinsurgency forces. NAF must 
thus strive to be perceived as a credible actor in counterinsurgency environments and 
must “ensure that all military operations, especially civil-military actions, deliver as 
promised.”335  In essence this means, “all actions must serve to create and sustain 
credibility in the eyes of the supported populace and government.”336 In the end, the 
likely effect of a steady increase in active support from the population is the following: 
first, better intelligence that counters the information disadvantage of the  
 
 
                                                 
332 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular 
Threats: An Updated Approach To Counterinsurgency Operations, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 7 June 2006), 14, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/manual.pdf, (accessed January 
24, 2009). 
333 Assisted and true preferences are discussed in Chapter II. 
334 Marine Corps , Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats,  14.  
335 Hoffman, “Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace,” 309.  
336 Ibid., 308. 
 107
counterinsurgent and enables him to conduct more effective operations against 
insurgency forces; second, less freedom of action for the insurgency movement to evoke 
support and supplies (people, guns, and money) from the population. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
 
 
Figure 7.   The Norwegian Model 
The purpose of the model is to relate the theory to the capabilities of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces.  The model also provides a holistic view of the theory, and 
thereby attempts to put the various parts in perspective.  In many ways, the Norwegian 
model can be seen as a depiction of the state actor in the Diamond Model.  In other 
words, the model describes the tasks and theory that governs the state actor in a 
counterinsurgency struggle. 
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The first pillar, provide security, is derived directly from strategy one in the 
Diamond Model.  The critical goal for providing security is to deny the insurgents the 
ability to influence the assisted preference of the population.  Successfully doing so will 
lead to information about the insurgent organization coming forward, and thus enable the 
dismantling of the insurgent organization.  Further, establishing security will make it 
easier to start building up local security forces as well as enabling the local government 
to carry out its function. 
The second pillar, train and assist host nation security forces, can be traced back 
to both information operation needs as well as nation-building requirements.  
Establishing host nation security forces is necessary from an IO point of view in order to 
establish an impression of the state as the ultimate winner of the conflict.  By influencing 
the population’s perception of who is the likely winner of the conflict, more support is 
likely to be forthcoming from the population.  From the nation-building point of view, it 
is also important to demonstrate the capability and intent of the host nation government.  
Establishing security forces that respond to the population’s needs is one of the most 
important services a government can deliver.  Establishing local security forces is of 
course also a necessary step before the intervening powers can successfully leave the host 
nation.  In any case, the successful establishing of local security forces is likely to 
influence the security situation positively. Not only does that give the rest of the 
government structure a much-needed boost, it also improves the conditions under which 
the rest of the government must function. 
The third pillar, improve governance, is derived from the requirements of nation-
building.  The ultimate goal of this activity is to produce a society that is at peace with 
itself, since it is the disequilibrium in society that created the insurgency in the first 
place.337  As such, establishing good governance will be the final determinant of whether 
the COIN effort will succeed or not.  At a more tangible level, improving governance 
needs to take aim at providing fundamental services to the population, as well as 
establishing the necessary revenue to run the state in the long run.   
                                                 
337 See Chapter II for a discussion of why insurgencies occur. 
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The relationships between the pillars are important to notice.  Without security, 
the other two are hard to get started.  Without establishing host nation security forces, 
security may be short-lived.  Further, the government may never be seen as sincere or 
genuine in its attempt to serve the population. Finally, without improving governance, 
any effort at establishing security and local capacities may be reversed in the long run. 
Information operations are illustrated to encompass all these three activities.  This 
depiction reflects the point illustrated in Chapter III, namely that a counterinsurgency is 
first and foremost a struggle that happens in the psychological and informational 
domains.  As such, information operations must permeate all efforts in the attempt to 
achieve the victory in these domains. 
This also reflects the critical conclusion from Chapter II, namely that it is the 
population that holds the key to success.  As demonstrated in the same chapter, it is not 
only the population’s true preference that determines the outcome, but also the 
insurgents’ ability to influence the population’s actions.  The primary goal of all efforts 
must therefore be to ensure the active support of the population.   
Finally, the nature of a counterinsurgency is complex, not only because of the 
span of the problem itself but also because of the multitude of actors that are likely to 
operate within the host nation.  Chapter IV established that the old precept of unity of 
command is no longer possible, and that a unity of effort needs to be a guiding principle 
for all actors.  This is necessitated by the time pressure to alleviate the problem as well as 
the limited resources at hand. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR NAF 
1. Security 
Given the imperative of denying the insurgents the ability to influence the 
population, a few deductions can be made.  Based on the discussion of the theory, it 
seems obvious that the Norwegian Armed Forces should be given the mission to protect a 
certain portion of the population in the host nation.  The size of this portion naturally 
depends on several factors, such as the level of the insurgent threat, the population’s  
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geographic dispersion, the capability and capacity of the host nation’s security forces, etc.  
As a rule of thumb it is still the size of the population, as opposed to the size of the area 
they live in, that is the most determining factor.  Theory points to a need for up to 20  
security personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants.  With a company-sized element, that ratio 
suggests that NAF may not be able to take on security responsibilities for more than 
10,000 individuals. 
Nevertheless, the situation needs to be taken into account.  Given the goal of 
providing security, the real recommended force ratio for NAF should be one where NAF 
at any time can deter or stop the insurgents from using force against the population.  This 
will prevent the insurgents from creating an assisted preference for their cause.  While 
this approach may increase the number to which NAF can provide security, it also 
contains other significant limitations.  One of these limitations is that the Norwegian 
security forces need to keep a continuous physical presence in the population that is being 
protected.  A situation where NAF will need hours to get to the scene is equal to one with 
no security presence at all; in such a case the insurgents will have the ability to enforce 
their threats and thus influence the population.  This implies that the larger the 
geographic area of responsibility the less concentrated the forces will have to be.  
Another imperative is that NAF will have to be responsive to the needs of the population.  
A traditional elaborate military process of mission analysis, planning, briefing, 
coordination, etc. may be out of the question when responsiveness is crucial.  It follows 
that the forces used for this kind of task need to be well trained and of high quality. 
This is not to say that all forces need to live among the population.  Galula 
recommends that the counterinsurgent solve these tasks through splitting his force into 
static and mobile units. 
It seems natural that the counterinsurgent’s forces should be organized 
into two types of units, the mobile ones fighting in a rather conventional 
fashion, and the static ones staying with the population in order to protect 
it and to supplement the political efforts338 
 
                                                 
338 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (2006), 65. 
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a. Static Security Forces  
Galula’s recommendation is in line with the theory described in Chapter 
II, and NAF should therefore employ static security forces in order to protect the 
population and assist in the host nation’s reclaiming its position.  These missions have 
several ramifications. 
It seems obvious that the static units must interact closely with the local 
population as well as formal and informal authority figures.  The rationale is that these 
forces are not only tasked with providing security for, but also winning the active support 
of the local population, which is also likely the best source of information with regards to 
the insurgency.  It follows that the units to which NAF assign the static security mission 
to need to be both culturally aware and well-versed in counterinsurgency.  Last but not 
least, static security units must not only have a thorough understanding of the 
psychological aspect and second- and third-order effects of all actions they undertake, but 
also know how to systematically influence the perceptions of the local population and 
leverage a basic information campaign in everyday operations. 
As the static units must operate and live among the population, they are 
protecting, as opposed to working out of larger and well-protected military operating 
bases, they must also be capable of providing their own security.  This is likely to have 
some consequences for both manning and equipment.  The largest adjustment, however, 
is arguably the transition from a culture that focuses on leaving the operating base for 
sharply defined missions over to a situation where the whole effort becomes one long 
operation.  That being said, it is a general perception and a source of pride in NAF that 
Norwegian soldiers are proficient at establishing a close rapport with its host population.  
To the extent that this is true, combat forces in the Norwegian Army should be well-
poised for taking on static security missions. 
It appears though that there is room for improvement with regards to the 
knowledge of the dynamics of population-centric conflicts and insurgencies, not only 
among Norwegian soldiers on the ground but throughout the ranks of NAF. Furthermore, 
Chapter V concluded that IO is a somewhat unexplored field within NAF, despite its vital 
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role in low-intensity conflicts in general and in insurgency conflicts in particular. NAF 
should focus on heightening the recognition and understanding of the dynamics of 
insurgency conflicts throughout the ranks through training and education. In addition, it 
can be argued that NAF also should recognize the crucial role of IO in COIN and that IO, 
if conducted properly, will act as a force multiplier. This entails that IO should not only 
be implemented as a special field within NAF, but also that systematical and deliberate 
IO pervades all operations conducted by NAF forces in a COIN environment.  
b. Mobile Security Forces  
The mobile security forces should be assigned two main missions.  The 
first is to reinforce the static units wherever necessary.  This mission is thereby very 
similar to the one assigned to quick reaction forces (QRF).  The second is to conduct 
operations directly against the insurgents and their resources.  Ideally, the static forces 
will enlist the support of the population and thereby be privy to updated information 
about the insurgents.  This information can and should then be acted upon, both to 
demonstrate to the population that the COIN forces are responsive and to reduce the 
insurgent threat. 
The missions for the mobile units are enemy-centric operations based on 
kinetic means, and thereby very much in the domain of conventional military operations.  
Therefore, combat units within NAF should be well-suited for this task as well.  While 
the missions for the mobile forces take on characteristics that are comparable to 
conventional enemy-centric operations, they are still part of an overall COIN campaign. 
An important distinction then is the primacy of the static mission.  Galula, as does most 
COIN theorists, underlines the danger of letting the conventional mission dominate.339  
He argues that the main effort needs to remain with the commander that has the territorial 
command, i.e., the commander of the static unit.340  It follows that whenever NAF use 
their mobile forces, these need to be subordinate to or subject to limitations set by the 
static forces. 
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A corollary to the argument above is that the psychological impact and 
long-term effects on the local population need to be considered by the mobile forces.  It is 
a widely accepted claim that too much focus on use of force can quickly undo all that the 
static units have managed to build.  IO, for instance, should be leveraged in order to 
emphasize the reasons and underpin the positive effects when kinetic operations are 
conducted.  As such, firm understanding and knowledge of the dynamics of insurgency 
conflicts is also necessary for mobile forces.  This directs that the recommendation with 
regards to training and education and implementation of IO is valid for NAF units, even 
if these, hypothetically, were solely to focus on the missions of the mobile units. 
c. Use of Special Operation Forces (SOF) 
Special Operation Forces are normally in high demand with regards to 
multinational COIN operations. Special Operation Forces units in general are often 
perceived as key to successful COIN operations. This is rooted in the history and 
missions of U.S. special forces, which to a large degree have been related to 
unconventional warfare (UW). Norwegian SOF (NORSOF), however, are primarily 
trained and organized, and aimed at conducting direct action (DA) missions at strategic 
and operational levels.341  Nevertheless, some of NORSOF’s qualities are applicable to 
providing security. 
First, NORSOF are designed to deploy and reach a full operational 
capability quickly.  At the same time, NORSOF are clearly of very limited size.  Further, 
the forces are also trained to operate independently in hostile or semi-permissive 
environments.  Taken together, these factors indicate that NORSOF should be considered 
for use in the initial phases of a COIN effort, or for employment where NAF have not yet 
deployed other forces.  It also means that NORSOF are unlikely to sustain a long-term 
mission. 
Second, the heritage from direct action missions does provide valuable 
skills in rapid reaction, integration of various intelligence sources, use of aerial platforms, 
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etc.  These skills may be very valuable in exploiting particularly time-critical intelligence, 
for instance, intelligence on key insurgent personnel.  As such, NORSOF are arguably 
very well-suited for conducting DA missions that are enabled by forthcoming intelligence 
from the population. 
Third, Petter Hellesen makes the case in his study of NORSOF and COIN 
that military assistance (MA) should be considered a primary mission as well.342  The 
MA mission entails training, organizing, and equipping host-nation forces.  NORSOF 
should be particularly suited for training other special operation forces.  Increased 
emphasis on the MA mission, however, requires that NORSOF increase its capability for 
understanding COIN and IO, as well as focusing on deeper cultural awareness and 
understanding.343 
2. Train and Assist Host Nation Security Forces 
Another mission for conventional military forces in COIN is the training and 
enabling of local forces to gradually take over control of their own territory and 
population. These missions follow the principles of MA, but are repeatedly also called 
foreign internal defense (FID). Regardless of which term is chosen to describe the 
activity, it is directly related to the pillar of train and assist host nation security forces in 
the authors’ Norwegian model. 
As concluded in Chapter IV, training and assisting host nation security forces is a 
task that has to be started as early as possible.  Emphasis has to be put on shifting the 
weight of effort from international military forces over to national police forces.  A few 
general guidelines can be drawn from this starting point. 
The first general guideline is the obvious statement that training of police forces, 
or police-like forces, should take priority over training military forces for national 
defense missions against conventional and external threats.  To the extent that NAF 
gravitate towards recreating host-nation forces in their own image, this tendency has to be 
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counteracted.  Spending time and resources on creating a conventional army will not do 
much to fight the insurgency; it may even be a drain on resources and thereby 
counterproductive.  What the police forces should look like, however, is very much 
dependent on the situation, as typical military capabilities might still be required.  Where 
insurgents operate in small numbers, an ordinary police force might be appropriate.  As 
the insurgent’s ability or will to use larger formations increase, the need for police 
capacities changes as well.  Chapter IV suggests that paramilitary forces might be the 
ideal response for most cases.  Under some circumstances, it might even be appropriate to 
train regular military forces to cover some basic police functions.  The common 
denominator, however, is that the focus should be on securing the local population and 
not on external threats to the nation in question.   
Second, the goal of creating or transforming a police force inherently raises the 
question of establishing a national-level program to handle training programs, equipment, 
standard procedures, etc.  While this might be desirable in the medium- and long-term, 
Chapter IV stresses the need to seize the opportunity that results from an international 
intervention.  According to this line of reasoning, local efforts to establish a police force 
should not be postponed in order to wait for such national-level programs to materialize.  
This implies that NAF should assure that local police entities operate in ways that 
underpin the overall effort of gaining the active support of the local population. This 
entails advising local police forces, but in the worst case scenario NAF must also be 
prepared to start a rudimentary police training program and run it until dedicated police 
assets or a national-level police training program take over.  If this is the case, NAF will 
face requirements for: personnel competent in such training; interpreters; capacity for 
rudimentary selection and vetting of personnel; supplying the local force with basic 
equipment; paying for the local police force; etc. Should Norwegian police assets be 
available for these tasks, it would still be a fair assumption that NAF would have to 
provide logistical support.  In any event, NAF need to be prepared to cooperate closely 
with police assets. 
Third, to the extent that spending time and money on training an army is deemed 
beneficial, the counterinsurgent should never lose sight of the fact that in a COIN context 
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the value of this army stems from two factors; the first being its application in 
counterinsurgency operations and the second being the population’s perception of it.  
Training and educating an army in proper counterinsurgency principles is in itself an 
arduous task—given the fundamental difference between conventional enemy centric 
warfare and population centric warfare.  The fact that the potential trainers often will 
come from a conventional background themselves only makes it more difficult.  It 
therefore follows that the personnel assigned such a task need to be well trained in 
counterinsurgency principles.  It also follows that these trainers should be given the 
mission of preparing the host-nation army for use in counterinsurgency operations. 
The value the population attaches to the army is largely a result of how the army 
behaves, which in turn is a result of how it is managed.  Magsaysay’s use of the 
Philippine Army, in what was termed civic action, is an example of how an army may 
transition to being perceived as useful.344 He recognized that army soldiers were the most 
visible symbol of government in rural areas and that “the government would be judged by 
the actions of its soldiers.”345  If the soldiers and officers of the new or transformed army 
are known to steal food, harm crops, harass travelers, or in other ways impede on the 
population’s daily life, it will represent a significant setback in convincing the population 
of the government’s good intentions.  If, on the other hand, the army’s personnel are 
always respectful of the population’s needs and property, it will likely cause a positive 
effect with regards to popular perceptions of the host nation government.  Therefore, this 
factor demonstrates the need to ensure that host nation soldiers and officers are paid 
regularly and provided sufficient logistical support.  For NAF, this once again underlines 
the requirement for trainers that fully understand the principles of COIN. Also, it means 
that a military training mission cannot focus on the operational side only; administration 
and logistics may be very important as well.  It may be deduced that the NAF should also 
be prepared to take responsibility for payments and logistics until the host nation army 
itself, or international programs, can properly handle these functions. 
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NAF are based on national compulsory service and it follows that training and 
educating personnel in basic soldiering and unit tactics is part of everyday life in 
Norwegian military units. Training and advising foreign forces that will be tasked with 
counterinsurgency duties is, however, different. In order to properly prepare and train 
local forces to conduct COIN operations, it requires that the personnel and units in charge 
of training and advising host nation forces have firm knowledge of how to conduct 
COIN. As such, mere basic soldier skills and knowledge of conventional military tactics 
and procedures will not be sufficient. Furthermore, culture and language barriers will also 
be a challenge in general. 
It follows that NAF units and personnel that are tasked with FID missions as part 
of a COIN campaign should go through comprehensive preparation and training before 
they take on FID duties. Such training must of course involve basic skills related to the 
training and education of military units and personnel, but should also focus on the 
culture and language of the nation in question. More importantly, NAF units and 
personnel conducting FID missions must also have a thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of insurgency conflicts. Such knowledge must be passed on to the forces they 
train and advise to truly prepare the forces for the threat from the insurgency they will 
have to quell.  It follows that NAF must focus on heightening the recognition and 
understanding of the dynamics of insurgency conflicts, to include IO-related aspects, in 
the units and personnel assigned to FID missions. As was the case with NAF conducting 
static and mobile security missions in COIN, this must be done through methodical 
training and education.   
3. Improve Governance 
The task of improving governance is not in itself a task primarily for military 
forces.  As demonstrated in Chapter IV, however, there are important connections 
between how the security component of a COIN force carries out its tasks on one side 
and how governance develops on the other side.  These connections may be divided into 
two broad groups. 
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The first group contains issues where governance may be improved as a result of 
the counterinsurgent working through host nation government structures.  If the 
counterinsurgent chooses to solve all tasks without involving such structures, they will 
not only miss the possibility to operate, but also the opportunity to positively demonstrate 
their utility to the local population.  Thus, it follows that NAF as a matter of routine 
should work through local structures as much as possible.  Examples of such involvement 
should be found in most of the counterinsurgent’s activity.  As concluded in Chapter IV, 
such cooperation may have to be limited to the lowest level initially, and then only 
gradually expanded to higher echelons of the host nation government.   
It is not given that such involvements are successful in all cases, and NAF need to 
be prepared to remedy problems within the local government as they become evident.  
One way of doing so is of course to make sure that the local structures have the resources 
to carry out the necessary tasks.  NAF should therefore be prepared to provide physical 
resources, such as logistical support, or make engineer units available.  Chapter V 
identified the most relevant units to be the Norwegian CIMIC Company and engineer, 
mine clearance, EOD, and medical units.  A critical insight, however, is that the value of 
such units does not primarily depend on their expertise, but rather on how they are 
employed.  For instance, a field hospital may have a big impact if it provides health 
services to the local population, educates local health care personnel, or supplies 
medications to local clinics.  If, on the other hand, the same field hospital is only used for 
treating Norwegian forces it will have no value for the larger issue of counterinsurgency 
at all.  Similarly, a Norwegian engineer company may help the local administration to 
repair the electrical grid or an irrigation system, which would arguably be valuable in 
restoring popular support for the administration.  Conversely, if the same engineer unit is 
exclusively used for building a forward operating base for Norwegian forces, then the 
COIN value is lost.  It follows that to the extent that NAF can employ niche capabilities, 
these may contribute greatly to the counterinsurgency efforts, provided that  




counterinsurgency forces.  Another important observation is that at the end of the day, it 
is the host nation government, and not NAF, that needs credibility and popular support.  
As Kitson wrote about coordinating allies conducting COIN:346 
The ultimate aim of the host nation […] is to retain and regain the 
allegiance of its population. If this is borne in mind, it at once becomes 
evident that the way in which the ally’s help is delivered is as important as 
the help itself, the main thing being that the host nation should be seen to 
be at the centre of the picture with the ally coming to its assistance.  
For that reason, NAF units need to support the host nation in a way that gives as 
much credit to the host nation as possible.  Again, this underlines the need for 
understanding counterinsurgency as well as pointing to the crucial role of IO generally 
and public affairs specifically.  It follows also that personnel in such niche units should 
be given a thorough understanding of counterinsurgency. 
Alternatively, money to buy services locally may be provided.  The solution that 
is implemented in Afghanistan, namely that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers 
funds for various projects, seems to be one way of providing this ability.  In the event that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is less involved than it is in Afghanistan, such funds 
should be made available to commanders of NAF units.  Regardless of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs involvement, military commanders should have smaller funds to fix 
important small and local problems.  Such ability has the potential to not only improve 
the living conditions of the local population, but also strengthen the stature of the 
counterinsurgent. Whether NAF choose to provide physical support or money, it follows 
that personnel within the logistics and administrative branches have to take on expanded 
roles, and that NAF commanders need to embrace this as a part of their mission. As with 
every other personnel category participating in COIN, the logistics and administrative 
personnel need to understand the fundamentals of COIN in addition to their specific role 
in providing support. 
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Further, it is important that local officials meet the expectations of the population.  
NAF should therefore seek to establish a system where officials are held responsible for 
their results, and where superiors are able to substitute subordinates that do not meet 
expectations. Collecting and managing information from interactions with the local 
government is thereby an important part of making the government work.  
The second group of connections includes cases where the NAF have an 
independent role in improving conditions.  It seems obvious that NAF have the ability to 
influence the local labor market and the local economy wherever it is operating.   It 
follows that such influence should be directed towards what serves the desired 
development.  Use of local labor is a good way of stimulating economic activity and 
provides legal opportunities for the population.  Hiring local companies for various 
projects will create the same effect.  As such, these opportunities should be exploited 
where possible.  In doing so, however, NAF should aim at establishing a fair and 
transparent process. As part of this process, contracting opportunities should be 
announced, and that the results should be announced in a similar way.  Further, when 
hiring local employees, NAF should recognize the needs of the host nation government as 
well.  Local nationals that speak English are naturally attractive for a number of jobs, but 
recruiting a university-educated individual to a job as a security guard or an interpreter 
may represent a lost potential for the local government.  To prevent draining the local 
work market of critical personnel for non-critical tasks, simple measures like offering 
courses in English should be considered.  Another remedy might be to identify personnel 
in Norway with the required language skills and actively recruit these individuals to 
service.   
4. Information Operations 
In Chapter II, the authors demonstrated that the most important factor in the 
outcome of the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents is how the silent 




information operations is therefore to influence the “silent majority” and the 
uncommitted members of the population, and generate a public opinion in favor of the 
counterinsurgency.347  
The decision that each individual has to make will in large parts be a mix of two 
variables: the individual's truly preferred outcome and the individual’s belief of what is 
likely to happen (i.e., an individual that believes that the insurgents are in a position to 
kill him and his family is not likely to proclaim his support for the government).  It 
follows that in order to influence behavior effectively, NAF’s information operations 
need to address both variables. 
Furthermore, there are many ways of defining or describing information 
operations. When addressing the way NAF should conduct IO and which means are 
required, it is useful to separate information operations into two domains.  The first is the 
information or psychological effect that stems from active or deliberate attempts at 
spreading information and directly influences the perceptions of the local populace.  Such 
attempts may come in the shape of psychological operations, deception operations, public 
affairs, etc.  The second domain covers second- and third-order information effects and 
influence on public opinion that arise from other operations—either kinetic or non-
kinetic.  Examples might include the establishment of an uncorrupt police force, a raid 
against insurgents, an accidental bombing of an innocent family, or providing of basic 
medical supplies to the local health clinic. 
In order to influence the first variable, the true preference, NAF’s information 
operations should be aimed at creating an impression of the government as the most 
attractive solution.  It is obviously necessary to underpin such an impression with 
substance, namely that the host nation government is truly making progress towards its 
aims.  In other words, the government needs to outperform any insurgent attempt at 
governing. Furthermore, IO in COIN “must be indigenous in content and execution”348 
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and hence culturally attuned and in accordance with local values and cultural norms.349  
It follows that information operations aimed at influencing the true preference within the 
silent majority of the population naturally lend themselves to the systematic use of public 
affairs and local proxy sources and channels for conveying messages.  It also seems 
legitimate to publicize positive results from other parts of the country where the 
government has succeeded.  NAF should thus systematically and broadly publicize their 
efforts to improve governance.  NAF should also identify and persuade key personnel in 
the community to lend their support in conveying positive perceptions of the government. 
In addition to promoting the government, discrediting the insurgents may be a 
worthwhile endeavor.  Religious and political fundamentalists are often able to garner 
support for their cause, despite extreme opinions, because they have an inherently better 
cultural foundation within the population than any foreign counterinsurgency force.  
Again, public affairs and the use of local proxy sources and channels are excellent means 
to expose the fact that the insurgents’ view of the post-conflict society is a highly 
unpopular one, should that be the case. The use of key social and cultural leaders as 
interlocutors between the counterinsurgent forces and the silent majority of the 
population is crucial in this regard. Key leadership engagement (KLE) is a vital part of 
information operations in contemporary COIN campaigns, and it has the potential to 
provide the counterinsurgent with an influential channel to convey his message, as well 
as counter the cultural foundation of the insurgency. It follows that KLE should be 
systematically exploited by NAF units in COIN operations.   
When attempting to influence the individuals’ calculations of what the future will 
bring, the game changes fundamentally.  As demonstrated in Chapter II, and as opposed 
to the shaping of the true preference, this calculation is likely to be dominated by short-
term concerns; when weighing the government’s promise of services against the 
insurgents’ threat to use violence, the immediate need to stay alive should be expected to 
take precedence over future benefits from the government.  In terms of IO, this means 
that NAF should carefully establish an impression of themselves as a credible and 
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reliable support for the population.  Based on this imperative, it follows that NAF should 
not widely publicize an intention to protect a certain population if the promise cannot be 
kept.  Similarly, stories of successful protection in other parts of the country have little 
importance if the same protection cannot be provided locally.  The policy should 
therefore be not to raise expectations above what can be delivered in terms of security.  A 
deduction would be that in security-related matters, the IO effect should be created as a 
side effect from physical operations rather than by relying on public affairs.  The earlier 
discussed need for being responsive will be a key factor in succeeding with this aspect of 
information operations.   
A related point is the need for consistency over time.  There is a danger in 
delivering security for an interval that is shorter than the life span of the insurgency.  The 
Taliban’s expression “The Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time”350 
amply demonstrates this point.  The removing of security before host nation forces can 
take over will result in a breakdown of credibility, which naturally will influence the 
individual’s calculation.  It follows that an important principle for NAF’s information 
operations will be to demonstrate that the NAF are committed to a long-term operation 
and then sticking to those promises.  The task of building host nation security forces is of 
course intimately related to this point.  As the population can see that their own 
government is taking over the responsibility for providing security, there is no need to 
rely on a continued presence of NAF or other international forces. 
In addition to influencing the population, NAF should also use IO to degrade the 
insurgents’ ability to operate.  While discrediting the insurgents’ goal may make the 
population less receptive, IO can also be used to directly influence insurgent operations 
and thus have a positive impact on the security pillar in the authors’ model. “…It is in 
men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided,”351 and systematic 
use of PSYOPS and deception programs have the potential to turn less motivated 
insurgents away from the hardliners and as well as sow distrust in the insurgent 
organization. This can be done, for instance, by releasing information that there is an 
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informer within the insurgent organization.  There are many ways IO can be used to 
influence insurgent operations and the case in point is merely aimed at exemplifying the 
potential of savvy information operations with regards to reducing the effect of and 
perceived freedom of action for insurgents. If done properly, however, this might cause 
the insurgents to lower their frequency of operations because of a perceived need of 
increased security and, in the best case scenario, make the insurgents go after their own 
people.  It follows that this is a desirable tool that NAF should seek to exploit in order to 
improve conditions in the area of operations. 
General Sir Frank Kitson argues that:  
All too often successful government action in the civil and military field is 
rendered completely useless because the machinery for exploiting success 
in the minds of the people is non-existent. At the same time the enemy 
who have suffered the reverse in fact, are able to nullify it, or even turn it 
to their advantage in the minds of the people…352  
As such, mere good deeds are insufficient in a COIN environment. To ensure long-term 
success, the counterinsurgent must systematically exploit every opportunity to establish 
favorable opinions and perceptions within the population. It follows that systematic and 
integrated information operations is a field NAF should explore further. 
5. Unity of Purpose 
Two factors argue against the need for coordinating between Norwegian 
contributions to a counterinsurgency operation, as opposed to just relying on the 
coordination provided by a UN or NATO framework.  First, Norway has an expressed 
policy of working within a coordinating framework, preferably the UN.  Assuming that 
such an overarching framework is working as intended, there should be no need to pursue 
integration between national contributions.  Second, as demonstrated in Chapter V, 
Norway’s means of coordinating at an operational level will in many cases be severely 
limited.  Still, there are some important benefits to be achieved through coordination 
between Norwegian assets.  These can be divided into four broad categories. 
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Obviously, national goals that from those of the framework organization (the UN, 
NATO, etc.) can best be pursued through standing out as an important contributor to the 
host nation.  Such differing national interests may be within the scope of the COIN 
operation, for instance a stronger promotion of women’s rights in societal reform – or 
outside it, as for instance access to the host nation for Norwegian petroleum companies.  
By integrating various Norwegian assets, Norway can take on responsibility for all facets 
of a counterinsurgency operation in a limited area.  By doing so, Norway should expect 
to gain a stronger connection to the host nation than what can be expected merely by 
filling disparate positions in a larger framework.  This stronger connection can then be 
leveraged to secure Norwegian interests. 
As a second category, Norway could benefit from demonstrating a truly integrated 
and effective approach to solving the insurgency problem.  By doing so, Norway would 
gain more acceptance for its initiative to reform international interventions.  This would 
arguably increase Norway’s image as a peacemaker, and thereby increase its soft power 
and influence around the world.353 
A third reason for seeking Norwegian integration would be to garner domestic 
support.  Counterinsurgencies often last for many years and entail a considerable risk for 
loss of lives.  Consequently, domestic popular support for a COIN operation is vital.  By 
clearly defining Norway’s role and its importance for the host nation, it would be 
reasonable to expect increased understanding and acceptance of the mission among the 
Norwegian population.  Such a clear delineation of the mission is obviously well served 
by having all Norwegian assets concentrating on a subset of the wider conflict.  
Conversely, spreading Norwegian assets over disparate tasks and areas makes it more 
difficult to achieve that clarity and thus acceptance.  Furthermore, Norwegians commonly 
pride themselves on having a spirit for volunteer work for the good of community 
(“dugnadsånd”).  To the degree that such spirit can be leveraged in a counterinsurgency 
operation, it seems obvious that it can only happen as long as volunteers and their 
organizations focus on a well-defined and thus limited problem. 
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Last but not least, pursuing integration between Norwegian assets does have the 
potential of increasing effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort.  The shared 
language and culture should make it easier to cooperate across functional areas.  It also 
seems like a fair assumption, based on the experiences from Afghanistan, that an 
integrated Norwegian mission will have better access to Norwegian policy-makers and 
thus the potential to address unforeseen problems through changing priorities or 
appropriation of extra funds. 
In addition to the advantages following a national integration, there are of course 
some disadvantages too.  The idea of an integrated approach is not only that the various 
elements operate together in a meaningful way, but also that they are properly sized to the 
tasks at hand.  As discussed above, both military and civilian Norwegian assets available 
for COIN are limited in numbers.  If a truly integrated approach is to be attempted among 
Norwegian assets, one might have to find the smallest common denominator, effectively 
reducing the contribution compared to what it could have been if only responding to the 
needs of a larger framework.  If, for instance, the Norwegian police are only able to cover 
two districts while the military is able to cover three districts, one still has to find a 
different solution for covering the third district with police officers, or scale the total 
contribution down to fit two districts.  When comparing security related forces (i.e., 
police or military forces) with components for civil COIN, the disparity may become 
greater.  This is due to the fact that such assistance may not be tied to a local situation, 
but rather to national or regional programs.   
In discussing whether or not a national integration should be pursued in addition 
to an intergovernmental framework, it is easy to overlook the fact that a good 
intergovernmental framework may take considerable time to bring about.  Similarly, the 
host nation’s ability to absorb financial aid may be poor in the initial stages of a 
counterinsurgency effort.  In such cases, a well-functioning national integration may be  
very valuable.  Chapter IV discussed the importance of exploiting the golden hour, and in 
the absence of an efficient international framework, a national integrated framework 
might be necessary to exploit the potential that arises as a result of an intervention. 
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The discussion above allows for a couple of recommendations.  First, NAF should 
recognize that their priorities need to be influenced by the common need of Norwegian 
contributions.  It follows that NAF will have to answer to both Norwegian authorities and 
the organization providing the international framework.  While this is clearly not an ideal 
situation, it is not very different from how NAF are used to operating in international 
operations.354  The international framework should be the primary command, while 
national channels may play a secondary role through assisting with coordination as well 
as providing necessary means.   
Second, it seems obvious that these national channels need an integration function 
at a level that is between the central government in Oslo and the various Norwegian 
components of the COIN forces.  As discussed in Chapter V, Norwegian embassies might 
be well-suited for this task.  If that is the chosen alternative, NAF should be prepared to 
support the other Norwegian contributors with means that further coordination.  Such 
means might be intelligence analysis or other assessments, public affairs resources, 
communication equipment, logistical support, or localities that support coordination 
efforts.  In such a case, NAF should also provide personnel to the Norwegian Embassy in 
order to assist with the coordination of NAF units. 
Should the case be that there is no Norwegian Embassy, or that the Embassy does 
not have the capacity to handle the necessary coordination for Norwegian COIN 
components, NAF should be prepared to provide even more support to facilitate such 
coordination.  The Norwegian NCC discussed in Chapter V could form the basis for such 
an element, but must, as a result of expanded responsibilities, be augmented with 
personnel and given sufficient authority to coordinate the use and allocation of 
Norwegian means. Another option would be to adapt the Mobile Tactical Land 
Command (MLTC) to handle such a task.  Such a solution would arguably be robust and 
rapidly deployable, which enables the opportunities of the golden hour to be exploited. 
The CIMIC Company355 is another potential source of manpower.  The details of 
                                                 
354 See Chapter V for a discussion on the National Contingent Commander. 
355 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defense], St.prp. 48, forsvar til vern om Norges 
sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007–2008), 19. 
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organizations and tasks are situation-dependent and also outside the scope of this study.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that COIN theory in general points to the need that 
civilians, and not military personnel, lead any COIN effort.356  It follows that NAF 
should be subordinated to a Norwegian civilian leader in the secondary chain of 
command.  It also seems evident that if such a coordination mechanism is built on a 
military framework, it has to integrate personnel from other non-military components in 
order to be successful.   
Third, there may not be a way around a situation where different contributions 
have varying impact areas; foreign aid funds are likely to continue contributions at a 
national or regional level, while security forces are severely limited in what they can take 
responsibility for.  Again, the primary goal of securing the active support of the 
population may be used as a guideline.  As discussed earlier, the most critical component 
of securing this support will be to provide security, given the assumption that the host 
nation regime is a palatable option for the population.  A common area of impact between 
Norwegian contributions therefore becomes most important within the security and 
establishing host nation security forces pillars, and less so in the improving governance 
pillar.  It follows that NAF should seek to harmonize their contribution so that they can 
cover the same impact area as the other components of the COIN contribution working 
on the first two pillars.  Nevertheless, the point can be made that from a COIN 
perspective, the effect of spending money may be greater where security forces operate as 
a result of the psychological effect such use will have on the local population.  
It is of course possible that the Norwegian government decides not to pursue any 
integration between Norwegian COIN assets, relying instead solely on the integration 
role of the international framework in use.  In such a case, NAF should be expected to  
integrate with other contributors that are part of the COIN effort.  Such integration and 
coordination should still follow the principles of the model discussed above, and as such, 
very little will be different from NAF’s point of view. 
                                                 
356 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (2006), 62. 
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The secondary chain of command, however, will of course take on a reduced 
importance.  One benefit of national integration is the possibility for “greasing” the 
system, i.e., retaining the flexibility and ability to solve problems that in other cases 
would remain unresolved for some time.  Such flexibility arguably exists both in terms of 
re-focusing physical resources as well as in terms of appropriating money to take care of 
pressing needs.  Given the importance of securing popular support, such flexibility should 
also be secured where there is no national integration of COIN assets.  It follows that 
NAF’s National Contingent Commander should be assigned the task of handling such 
needs on behalf of NAF forces, so that seemingly small but important problems do not 
become subjects to slow bureaucratic processes or lose the struggle for priority.   
6. Summary and Recommendations 
Whenever NAF commit combat forces to a counterinsurgency effort, the highest 
priority mission should be to protect the population.  The goal of this mission should be 
to prevent the insurgents from threatening the population, thereby denying the insurgents 
the ability to secure passive or active support from the population.  The primary 
determinant of how many people NAF may take a security responsibility for is the 
population/security force ratio recognized as necessary for success.  In any case, NAF 
need to ensure a continuous physical presence among the protected population.  That also 
means that the forces assigned to this mission should be prepared to live and operate 
among the population twenty four hours a day.  In addition, these forces need to be 
responsive; they must be able to react quickly to distress calls from the people being 
protected. 
In addition to the forces performing static security missions, NAF should keep 
mobile forces to reinforce the static forces, follow up intelligence on insurgent personnel 
or material, and fight larger insurgent formations.  The major concern in using such 
mobile forces is their ability to undo what the static forces built.  The principles for COIN 




static security missions only, mobile missions only, or a combination of the two.  As a 
general guideline, mobile forces should be subject to limitations set by the static forces or 
directly subordinated to the static forces.  
Norwegian special operations forces also have a role to play.  Their ability to 
quickly deploy and operate in unknown areas might be very useful early on in a COIN 
operation.  Beyond that, NORSOF should be tasked with developing and executing direct 
action missions against key insurgent personnel.  As a last category, NORSOF should 
also be tasked with training missions of host nation forces, in particular training of 
special operation forces. 
Furthermore, NAF should be prepared to conduct training of host nation security 
forces.  This mission needs to be started as early as possible, and NAF may find it 
necessary to not only train, but also select, equip, and pay forces until the host nation is 
ready to take over these responsibilities.  Of particular importance is the need to focus on 
the establishment of an accountable and responsive police force.  To the extent that 
resources are spent on training an army, this army needs to be focused on COIN 
operations as well as managed in such a way as to create popular support for the host 
nation government.  Again, NAF should be prepared to take on a responsibility beyond 
providing advice; logistical support and payments may be critical to demonstrate the 
utility of the army. 
NAF should also aim to improve governance both indirectly and directly.  In an 
indirect way, NAF may improve governance by working through the host nation 
government wherever possible.  Several niche capabilities within NAF are well-suited for 
supporting important government services, and NAF should consequently be given 
missions that help the local government to create popular support.  Further, NAF should 
be prepared to either directly use money or support other entities that use money in order 
to help the local government or administration to function in such a way that it will gain 
its constituents’ support.  At the very least, NAF commanders should have small funds to 
take care of small problems.  In addition, NAF should be cognizant of the performance of 
host nation leaders at all levels and seek to rectify any shortcomings through assistance in 
making leaders responsible for their results.  In a more direct way, NAF should support 
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the creation of a milieu where business and contracts are managed in a fair and 
transparent way.  NAF also need to recognize the manpower needs of the host nation and 
avoid using human resources that may be important for the local government to function 
properly. 
This study has also established that NAF need to emphasize information 
operations. First, because “it is in men’s minds that wars of subversion have to be fought 
and decided.”357  Second, because there is arguably much to be desired of both means 
and understanding of information operations within NAF.  Information effects should be 
created both as second- or third-order effects of other operations, and as direct effects of 
deliberate distribution of information.  IO should seek to create a true preference for the 
host nation government.  In doing so, NAF might find it useful to use local proxy sources 
to discredit the attractiveness of the opponent.  IO should also seek to counteract an 
assisted preference for the insurgency among the population.  Such an effect has to be 
built carefully and without promising more than what can be delivered.  Finally, IO 
should also be employed to degrade the opponents' operations.  This may be done either 
by degrading the insurgents’ sense of security, by disrupting their ability to command and 
control, or both. 
Lastly, the added requirements for coordination of military and non-military as 
well as kinetic and non-kinetic means in a long-term perspective suggest that NAF will 
need a resilient command and control element at the operational level.  Such an element 
should operate as a secondary command line and be prepared to exploit and facilitate 
synergetic effects and enhance efforts of the multinational organization that NAF units 
will be a part of in a COIN environment. 
 
 
                                                 
357 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 31. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Two factors necessitate this study.  First, there is an expressed political goal in 
Norway to use a comprehensive approach to peace-building operations, to include 
counterinsurgencies.  There seems to be very limited work on how the Norwegian Armed 
Forces should participate in such an approach, which in itself implies a need for this 
study.  Second, there seems to be a general agreement among scholars that 
comprehensive operations will be far more effective in reaching their goals than their 
traditional counterparts.  Succeeding in a comprehensive approach will therefore lead to 
more effective operations and better results.  That is in itself critical, but also has the 
potential of enhancing Norway’s position in the international community.   
The key conclusions arrived at in this study are as follows: 
 The Norwegian Armed Forces should primarily focus on protecting the 
population through static security missions.  The purpose of this is to 
prevent the insurgents from influencing the population and thus overcome 
the insurgents’ information advantage. 
 Mobile missions are also necessary in order to reduce the capacity 
of the insurgents, but these forces need to be subject to limitations 
set by the static missions due to the inherent risk in the use of 
military force.   
 Training and assisting host nation security forces is also a critical 
component of success as well as necessary for letting the host 
nation reassume responsibility of its own territory. 
 The Norwegian Armed Forces should recognize the role of information 
operations in counterinsurgencies and the importance of influencing the 
local population.  The reason for this is that insurgency conflicts “are 
fought politically and psychologically, with the assistance of military 
capabilities.”358  
 The Norwegian Armed forces should also recognize the importance and 
challenges of creating popular support for the host nation government.  To 
this end, the Norwegian Armed Forces should employ non-kinetic means 
alongside other COIN components in re-establishing host nation 
government structures and functions. 
 
                                                 
358 Stillwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” 319. 
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 There is also a need for coordination as well as maintaining a long-term 
perspective among Norwegian actors at the operational level. The 
Norwegian Armed Forces should be prepared to facilitate and host such 
coordination.  Such means should support a Norwegian Embassy where 
applicable, and could offer added coordination and flexibility with regards 
to exploitations of Norwegian non-kinetic means.    
 Finally, a counterinsurgency is not a lesser-included case of conventional 
military operations; COIN is fundamentally different and arguably a lot 
more complex than the operations that traditionally have occupied most 
military organizations.  In order to be successful, NAF have to provide 
their officers and soldiers with a thorough understanding of such conflicts.  
Such an understanding has to be present throughout the organization, 
logisticians and foot soldiers alike.  This, however, is not enough.  
Winning the battle for men’s minds also requires a deep understanding of 
the men and women in question.  Therefore, the need for education stands 
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